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Esta dissertac¸a˜o analisa o processo que levou a` independeˆncia do Brasil em 1822 e o
processo posterior de estabilizac¸a˜o da nova nac¸a˜o. Analisamos este per´ıodo a partir da
perspectiva da literatura sobre coevoluc¸a˜o entre instituic¸o˜es e cultura. Em particular, e´
constru´ıda uma narrativa anal´ıtica aplicando um arcabouc¸o que enfatiza a interrelac¸a˜o
entre instituic¸o˜es e crenc¸as. A chegada da famı´lia real portuguesa em 1808 e as reformas
subsequentes levaram a` emergeˆncia da crenc¸a em um Brasil autoˆnomo mas que mantinha
lac¸os formais com Portugal. A independeˆncia brasileira pode ser entendida como uma crit-
ical transition que aconteceu quando a crenc¸a da elite pol´ıtica brasileira em autonomia
sem independeˆncia foi posta em xeque pelas ac¸o˜es da Corte portuguesa. Estas ac¸o˜es anti-
brasileiras implicaram que as instituic¸o˜es vigentes na˜o gerariam os resultados esperados
e portanto uma mudanc¸a substancial, i.e. independeˆncia, era necessa´ria. Mas, indepen-
dentemente da mudanc¸a nas instituic¸o˜es pol´ıticas, o status quo econoˆmico e social na˜o
mudaram um exemplo de qua˜o persistentes sa˜o as instituic¸o˜es.
Palavras-chave: instituic¸o˜es. mudanc¸a institucional. crenc¸as.

Abstract
This dissertation analyzes the process that led to the independence of Brazil in 1822 and
the posterior process of stabilization of the new nation. Our analysis is guided by the
literature on the co-evolution between institutions and culture. In particular, we build
an analytical narrative applying a framework that emphasizes the interrelation between
institutions and beliefs. The arrival of the Portuguese royal family in 1808 and the sub-
sequent reforms led to the emergence of the belief in an autonomous Brazil but that held
formal links with Portugal. Brazilian independence can be understood as a critical tran-
sition that happened when the belief of the Brazilian political elite on autonomy without
independence was put in check by the actions of the Portuguese Cortes. This implied
that the institutions in place would not generate the expected outcomes and therefore a
substantial change, i. e. independence, was necessary. But, regardless of the changes in
the political institutions, the economic and social status quo did not change, an example
of how stick institutions are.
Keywords: institutions. institutional change. beliefs.
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Introduction
In the first decades of the 18th century, the former Iberian colonies in the American
continent freed themselves from the colonial rule and formed new independent countries.
But the path taken by these former colonies were completely different, while the former
Spanish colony went through a process of balkanization and from the four distinct vice-
royalties in which it was divided emerged seventeen different nations. In contrast, the
former Portuguese America that by the time of independence was divided in eighteen
captaincies general became a unique country, Brazil.(CARVALHO, 2003, pages 13-18)
Moreover, while the countries that emerged from the former Spanish colony adopted
republican governments, Brazil became a monarchy. Our goal here is to analyze this
period of Brazilian history for understanding why Brazil took such a unique institutional
path when compared with its neighboring countries.
In particular, we are going to use the framework developed by Alston et al. (2016)
to build an analytical narrative analyzing the Brazilian transition from colony to an
independent monarchy. This framework follows the recent literature about institutional
evolution, focusing on the co-evolution between culture and institutions giving particular
prominence for the role of beliefs in affecting institutional change. This framework is
heavily influenced by Douglass North urge to integrate culture and beliefs into the analysis
of institutional change and was inductively built by Alston and co-authors when analyzing
recent Brazilian history (1964 - 2014). It emphasizes the role of beliefs and leadership in
explaining the substantial institutional change, the so-called critical transitions; therefore,
it is particularly appropriated as a lens for looking at the process of independence and
institutional-making in a new nation.
An analytical narrative is defined by Bates et al. (1998) as ”a case-oriented method-
ology for studying institutional development in historical context.” So, it is a narrative
because we must pay close attention to history and context. But it is also analytical be-
cause it applies a formal model or framework to discipline the explanation. Given the
complexity of the world, we need a theory to guide us through all the events and enable
us to identify the meaningful ones. Therefore an analytical narrative is by definition a
historical work, but guided and constrained by a formal theory or framework. And this
is what we intend to do here, to apply the framework in such a way that helps us to
understand which were the key players and events that explain why Brazil could keep its
territorial integrity and adopted a monarchic government.
As stressed by Alston et al. (2018) the impact of institutions and institutional
changes are extremely specific and contextual. Therefore, throughout the building of the
narrative we do not have smoking guns or significant t-statistics that will prove our affir-
mations, but we expect to present enough circumstantial evidence that is consistent with
our conclusions. And our main conclusion is that Brazil became a monarchy because the
players that could affect institutions at that moment desired to keep the integrity of the
territory and believed that a monarchy and the image of a king were necessary for this.
And this conclusion is in line with one of the main concepts in the main framework,
that the beliefs of the dominant network1 shape the institutional choices that they make,
and therefore the institutions put in place in a given society.
Beyond being an analysis of a key moment in Brazilian history, this work also
serves as a test for the framework in itself. Seeing how useful it is for understanding
periods distinct from that on what it was inducted from. What we will see, is that even
though it is indeed applicable some adjustments were necessary. First, we had to focus
just on the political axis, because even though Brazil went through a considerable change
in its political institutions, the economic and social status quo continued being the same.
Moreover, it was necessary to incorporate the role of foreign relations for getting a better
understanding of the institutional choices made on the period.
This master’s dissertation proceeds as follows: in chapter 1 it’s made a comprehen-
sive review of the literature about institutions and institutional change. This chapter is
divided into three parts. First, we review the basic concepts of Institutional and Organi-
zational Analysis. In the second part, we review the mainstream view about institutional
change, what we called The Social Conflict view, and the emerging literature that em-
phasize the relationship between culture and institutions. Beyond this introduction and
the conclusion, this master’s dissertation proceeds as follows: In chapter 2, we build the
analytical narrative for the period from 1808 to 1847, divided in three parts, 1) 1808-1820,
2)1821-1830, and 3)1831-1847.
1 The political elite in (ACEMOGLU; JOHNSON; ROBINSON, 2005) terms.
1 Institutions and institutional change
”History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past,
but because the present and the future are connected to the past by the
continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are
shaped by the past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story
of institutional evolution.” Douglas North1
Even though economists still cannot define how to make countries to develop, there is a
consensus in the profession that Institutions are the main explanation of the compara-
tive development between countries.(AOKI, 2007) Although there are skeptical as Jeffrey
Sachs and Glaesar et al. (2004), examples such as the divergent economic performance
of North and South Korea in the second part of the 20th century, or the failure of So-
cialism make difficult to deny the central role of institutions in determining the economic
performance of a society.
It is undeniable that the study of institutions has shed light in many issues that
Neoclassical theory by itself could not answer, but there are some questions that continues
to be elusive to us.2 For example, why some societies fail to adapt to exogenous shock and
decay? Or why do poor countries don’t just adopt good institutions, and how and why
institutions change over time? We still do not have definitive answers to these questions
because we do not have a widely accepted(and convincing) theory of institutional change.
Although we still do not have such theory, there is a growing body of literature
about this issue. In the same way that Institutional Economics departed from Neoclassi-
cal economics by incorporating transactions costs into the analysis, to study institutional
change we must relax some assumptions such as the rationality hypothesis, and incor-
porate another concepts into our analysis, such as path dependence, non-ergodicity, and
beliefs.
.
1.1 The building blocks of Institutional and Organizational Analy-
sis
Before discussing the proposed extensions, it is necessary to define and clarify what are the
basic concepts of Institutional and Organizational Analysis(IOA).These building blocks
1 NORTH, D. C. N. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. [S.l.]: Cambridge
University Press, 1990. ISBN 9789004310087.
2 Parts 1 and 2 from Alston et al. (2018) is a good introduction to many of the knowledge generated
by Institutional and Organizational Analysis.
are institutions, norms, and organizations. Institutions are ”the humanly devised con-
straints that shape human interaction,”3 and they are created to diminish the uncertainty
inherent in human interaction.(NORTH, 2005) By defining what is mandatory or expected
and the enforcement rules, institutions make up the incentive structure of a society and
therefore defines its political and economic performance. Following Alston et al. (2018),
and departing from North, I will reserve the term institutions for the formal rules and use
norms when discussing the informal constraints.4
Institutions are the formal rules of a society, devised and enforced by recognized
entities. In our modern society, this entity usually is the State and some organization
related to any of their branches. In contrast, norms are not devised by anybody, but are
rules of behavior and its enforcement characteristics that emerge through repeated inter-
action. Norms tend to be society-specific, reflecting the history and ideological basis of the
society. Moreover, norms may affect how people react to the formal rules, explaining why
the same institutions when put in different societies may create different outcomes. See
for example, the implementation of Constitutions in the former Spanish and Portuguese
colonies in the Americas in the 19th century. Although inspired by the American consti-
tution, the social reality in these societies were different from those of the former thirteen
colonies, and therefor the outcomes differed too. This implies that formal rules that are
too far from the customs of a society may create unexpected outcomes, or just be ignored.
Therefore, it is not a surprise that many formal rules are codification of previous existing
norms, and that many exist just in paper but not in reality.
Institutions exist in different levels, and goes from structuring the interaction of
organizations in a society to the internal rules of an organization.5 For this work, what
matters are the society-level institution, those regulating the interactions between indi-
viduals or organizations, and the constitutional-level institutions, the meta-institutions
that defines when, how, and by who institutions can be created and changed.
An organization consists of a group of people bound together pursuing a mix of
common and individual goals by coordinated action.(ALSTON et al., 2018, pg. 16) Or-
ganizations can be political, economic, or social and their specific form is determined by
the opportunity-set created by the institutional structure6 of a society. Although orga-
nizations are created as an answer to to current institutions, they are not passive. If an
organization perceives an opportunity that can be exploited only by changing the insti-
tutions, they will try to affect and change the institutions. And the reverse is also true, if
they see that some institutional reform would be detrimental to their interest, they will
3 Ibid., pg. 3
4 The definitions discussed in this section are all based in Alston et al. (2018), unless noted in contrary.
5 For a more complete discussion about this, see Alston et al. (2018, pgs. 35 - 41)
6 I use institutional structure and institutional framework as interchangeable names, both meaning the
combination of formal rules, norms, and their enforcement characteristics.
try to block these changes.7
North, Wallis e Weingast (2009) distinguishe between adherent and contractual
organizations. Adherent organizations must be self-enforcing because there is not a third
party enforcing the agreements reached by the members. This implies that in every mo-
ment of time it must be incentive-compatible, i.e., it must be in the self interest of all
members to act as agreed. Any group that deals with illegal operations, from criminal
to revolutionary, is an adherent group, and therefore must have built-in mechanisms to
ensure cooperation and rule-following behavior by its members. Contractual organizations
combines incentive-compatible agreement between the members with third-party enforce-
ment of contracts. Any non-familiar firm is an example of this type of organization. At
the same time that it must build a contract that solve or at least alleviates the agency-
problem, it also can solve problems with suppliers or employees through the Judicial
System, and, at least in developed societies, to have a reasonable expectation that any
judicial decision will be enforced by the State.(NORTH; WALLIS; WEINGAST, 2009)
Summing up the previous discussion, institutions and norms form the incentive
structure of the society. The impact of institutions are dependent on the norms and cus-
toms of a society, although they also can affect the norms that will emerge. Organizations
emerge as an answer to the institutions framework and are the major players in insti-
tutional change. Using these concepts, we are ready to move on and discuss the issues
related to the evolution of institutions.8
1.2 Institutional change
As previously noted, one of the main questions in IOA is why societies fail to adopt
the correct9 institutions for growth and development. If institutions rule as a cause of
development10, and underdeveloped countries can observe the institutions that exist in
developed world, why do not they use these countries as role models and reform their
institutions? Moreover, why societies that in a given moment had institutions compatible
with development failed to adapt to changes in external conditions and shrink?
7 Institutional change is the central theme of this work, and therefore it is better discussed below.
8 For a more complete and classic discussion of institutions and organizations see North (1990, chapters
1 and 9)
9 It is hard to define what would be the correct institutions, but North, Wallis e Weingast (2009) notes
that the actual developed countries are Open Societies, i.e., societies with open access to the formation
of organizations and with widespread impersonal social relationships. (ACEMOGLU; ROBINSON,
2013) and (ALSTON et al., 2016) reinforce the notion that political openness is a necessary condition
to long-term positive economic performance. I believe that the economic and political development of
China in the 21th century will be a good test for this proposition.
10 There is a great amount of empirical evidence in this direction. See for example, Acemoglu, Robinson
e Johnson (2001) and (RODRIK; SUBRAMANIAN; TREBBI, 2004)
1.2.1 The Social Conflict view
The most accepted answer to these questions is the offered by Acemoglu, Johnson e
Robinson (2004), the so-called Social Conflict view. For these authors institutional change
takes place only if these changes are in the self-interest of those with enough political power
to affect institutions.
Acemoglu, Johnson e Robinson (2004) distinguish between economic and political
institutions. Economic institutions shapes the economic incentives of the society, therefore
influencing investments and the organization of production This implies that the economic
institutions determine the economic outcomes and the distribution of economic resources.
Political institutions define de jure political power, i.e., those who formally can create and
change the formal rules. But more things affect the distribution of political power than
the political institutions. For example, the ability to solve the collective action problem
is also a source of de facto political power. A power that is not given by the institutional
framework, but that an organization gains by its ability to mobilize and coordinate its
members. The inequality in resources also affect de facto political power, by the simple
fact that any undertake take costs and the more resources an organization has, the more
it can invest in seeking its goal.
Figure 1 – AJR’s dynamic framework
Economic institutions are put in place by those with political power. The individual
preferences over economic institutions are heterogeneous, because they determine the
allocation of resources, and therefore different combination of economic rules will benefit
different groups. If there are groups with substantial de facto political power, but without
de jure, the will seek to institutionalize their actual political power.11 This process is
schematically shown in the figure 1. .
In the initial moment t the political equilibrium is defined by the combination of de
jure political power, the allocation of resources, and the coordination ability of different
organizations. The political elite defined by this equilibrium, i.e., those with real power
to affect the formal rules, determines the economic institutions that are put in place and
11 They seek to do this because textitde facto political power is more volatile than textitde jure.
also the political institutions in t+1. These economic institutions will define the economic
performance and also the distribution of resources in the next period.
The main implication of AJR’s framework is that institutional change will happen
only when some groups with sufficient political power see a possible change as advan-
tageous, and the losers are incapable of blocking the change.12 Moreover, given that the
resources inequality affects the distribution of de facto political power, the elites will block
any economic reform that they expect to affect negatively their access to political power.13
The concepts and the framework discussed so far explain much. But there are
some questions that it cannot answer. For example, why some societies fail to reform even
when in the interest of their elites?(IYIGUN; RUBIN, 2017) Or, given that the relation
between Institutions and Outcomes is not direct, because the norms will affect how people
react to the formal rules14 , how much political elites really can know about the impact
of institutions that they put in place? And if they cannot know for sure, how do they
choose institutions to be implemented? To analyze these questions there is a literature that
goes beyond the basic tenets of IOA and incorporate the role of culture in institutional
performance and evolution.
1.2.2 Culture and its relationship with Institutions
Culture is an elusive concept and it seems that almost any author that discuss culture has
its own definition. For this work I follow Alston et al. (2018) that define culture as ”a set
of beliefs, values, and preferences, capable of affecting behavior, that are socially trans-
mitted and that are shared by a subset of society.” This combination of beliefs, values,and
preferences emerge through an adaptive process of accumulating solutions to previous
faced problems, and evolves and survive through inter-generational transfer.(NORTH,
2005) Culture is such an important concept that there are two research programs, not
strictly related, that are worth mentioning. Economists are focusing on studying the re-
lationship between institutions and culture, and in the field of Anthropology the focus
is on Cultural Evolution and cultural-genetic co-evolution15. But why should economists
care about culture, and how could culture affect institutions?
One of the channels through which culture can affect institutions is by affecting the
institutions that are put in place by a specific society. For example, Alesina, Glaeser e Sac-
erdote (2001) annalyze the causes of the difference between the American and European
12 Another possibility is that those adversely affected by the change perceives it as the minor evil. See for
example, the discussion about ”Why the West extend the franchise” in Acemoglu e Robinson (2000)
13 Acemoglu e Robinson (2013, chapter 8) is full of examples of political elite blocking economic reforms
that would improve the society’s economy, but maybe diminish their political power in the process.
14 NORTH, D. C. N. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. [S.l.]: Cambridge
University Press, 1990. ISBN 9789004310087.
15 A good introduction to Cultural-genetic co-evolution is Henrich (2015)
welfare systems and conclude that the main cause is that the majority of the population
believes that the redistribution favors racial minorities, and that if someone is poor, is
due to their own fault. Fischer ( apud ALESINA; GIULIANO, 2015, pages 916-917), doc-
uments as the culture brought by four migration waves of the initial settlers (Puritans,
Cavaliers, Quakers, and the Scottish-Irish) in the United States, lead to the creation of
very different institutions, reflecting their cultural heritage. But the main example of cul-
ture affecting institutions is the comparative analysis of the Maghrib and Genoese traders
made by Greif (1994), where he finds that although facing the same trade opportuni-
ties and with the same technology, each group developed distinct institutions to make
long-range trade possible. And the adoption of different institutions is explained by their
distinct cultures. The Maghribi were from a Jewish-Muslim background, with a collec-
tivist cultural belief 16 what led to a ”collectivist society with and economic self-enforcing
collective punishment,” with ”an in-group social communication network.” In contrast,
the Genoese with their Christian background and an individualistic cultural belief, had
to resort to contractual relationships, backed by ”formal legal and political enforcement.”
This lead to the development of an ”extensive legal system for registration and enforce-
ment of contracts,” and the creation of permanent courts. Institutional innovations never
employed by the Maghribi.
The above examples show that the cultural background of a society affects its
institutional organization. This already hints that to ask ”Why society x does not adopt
the institutions used by society y?” may be a mistake, because the current institutions
reflect not just the interest of the elites but also the cultural heritage of that society.
Nevertheless, the direction of causation is not only from culture to institutions. There are
evidences that institutions or specific events have long-term effects in culture and beliefs.
For example, Alesina, Giuliano e Nunn (2013) find statistical evidence of how the usage
of the plough in traditional agriculture have affected contemporary beliefs about gender
equality. Nunn e Wantchekon (2011) find evidence of a negative relationship between trust
in others and how much one’s ethnic group suffered from slavery in the past. Moreover,
(ALESINA; FUCHS-SCHUNDELN, 2005) finds evidence that living under Communism
affected people’s preference, for example, decreasing their level of trust. This implies that
there is a bi-directional feedback relationship between culture and institution. Therefore, it
is counter-productive, and maybe impossible, to try to understand institutional evolution
in a given society without making reference to its history and culture.
Alesina e Giuliano (2015) survey a great part of the literature about the rela-
tionship between culture and institutions and concludes that the most promising line
of research is the one that ”recognize and embrace a two-way effect” between culture
16 Greif defines cultural beliefs as ”the ideas and thoughts common to several individuals that govern
interaction-between these people, and between them, their gods, and other groups-and differ from
knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or analytically proved.”
and institutions.17 In this perspective, culture and norms influence the institutions that
are put in place, but the institutional landscape leads to the emergence of new customs
and defines which beliefs and values will survive and be transmitted to next generations.
Moreover, if we consider that culture and institutions co-evolve, we must consider the pos-
sibility of ”multiple stable equilibria with different sets of self-enforcing institutions and
cultural norms.”(ALESINA; GIULIANO, 2015, p. 916) This possibility of multiple equi-
libria implies that ”the same institutions may function differently in different cultures, but
culture may evolve in differing ways depending on the type of institutions.”(ALESINA;
GIULIANO, 2015, p. 938)
Institutions are a link between past, present, and the future, but they are also
strongly affected by culture. Given that a society’s culture is defined by their historical
experiences, path dependence will be a widespread phenomena. Therefore, focusing in
the co-evolution of a society’s culture and institutions through history it’s necessary for
enhancing our historical understanding, and for grasping the real difficulties related to
institutional change. That’s why in the historical part of this work we strive to go beyond
just to define what were the organizations with political power, but also try to define
which were their beliefs and how these beliefs affected the institutional landscape and the
outcomes generated by the institutions put in place.18
The main framework utilized in this work takes seriously the idea of co-evolution
between institutions and culture. Following North (2005), it is built using beliefs as a key
element in explaining institutional choice and change. But, before delving into this frame-
work, we are going to review some related literature that consider the role of beliefs(or
ideas) as the explanations for some historical events.
The role of beliefs in historical understanding
It is undeniable that people react to incentives and therefore institutions matters. But,
as emphasized by Henrich (2015), we are a cultural species and also have preferences
for status and peer respect. Therefore, the social perception of an occupation affects the
institutional treatment dispensed to it and who enters that occupation. And this in the
heart of McCloskey’s critique of New Institutional Economics as being ”Samuelsonian”,
i.e., treating institutions and norms just as incentives. She calls for a more subtle consid-
eration of social relations. McCloskey (2017) attacks the idea that institutions were the
cause of Industrial Revolution, or the ”Great Enrichment” as she calls it , emphasizing
instead the role of ideas. She defends that just when entrepreneurship and commerce be-
came acceptable and honorable the human were capable to escape from the Malthusian
17 They define culture as the combination of beliefs and values.
18 A relevant idea developed by Bisin e Verdier (2017) is that the effect of new institutions are dependent
on the emergence of supporting cultural traits.
trap. Because now the gains of trade, that every economist emphasize, became realizable
and even ethical.19
Joel Mokyr also defends the role of ideas in explaining the ”Great Enrichment”, as
he stresses that the Baconian idea of useful knowledge is part of the explanation behind
the technological advancement that marked the Industrial Revolution. His point is not
that institutions were irrelevant, but that they were more a necessary than a sufficient
condition for the Industrial Revolution and the posterior economic development of a
crescent part of the world. (MOKYR, 2007) But the main reference about the role of
beliefs in understanding institutional change is North (2005).
North emphasizes the role of belief systems in guiding our actions, and in particular
the institutional choice. For North, even if we accept the social conflict perspective, we
must consider beliefs of the elites, because the institutional structure of a society is the
external representation of the belief system of those with enough political power to affect
institutions. This implies that we must understand the ”cultural heritage of a society”
and ”the belief structure underlying the existing institutions” before making any proposal
about institutional change. And was by taking seriously the ideas developed by North that
Alston et al. (2016) developed the framework that we will discuss now.
1.3 An analytical framework for understanding institutional change
In this work we use the framework developed by Alston et al. (2016) to guide our analysis
of Brazilian history. It is an example of the works in Economics that uses culture to
explain institutional evolution and performance. In particular, although this framework
have many components that interact to create a dynamical ”theory”, its special element
is how the beliefs of the relevant players20 shape the institutional choices that they make,
and therefore the institutions put in place in a given society. In this section I will first
present each of the elements of the framework, and after this I combine them and discuss
the framework’s dynamic.
1.3.1 The Elements
The individuals elements of the framework are: Dominant Network, Leadership, Windows
of Opportunity, and Beliefs.
19 A good introduction to McCloskey’s ideias is Boudreaux (2014).
20 The political elite in AJR therms
The dominant network
The dominant network of a society is the group of organizations and individuals that
have de facto political power, i.e., those who really can affect and change institutions.
It is important to note that different organizations inside the dominant network may
have contrasting preferences and would prefer different institutions, therefore the specific
institutional landscape is determined by the relative power of those in the elite.(ALSTON
et al., 2016)
In the same way that the leader of an organization must solve the agency prob-
lem, the main members of a dominant network must deal with the problem of internal
coordination. This implies that the coalition must have rents that are compliance incen-
tive compatible, i.e., the network must be an adherent organization. It is also necessary
that the organizations outside the dominant network see the actual situation as the best
feasible situation. This does not imply that they like the current institutions, just that
they do not believe that a positive change is possible.
Although the organizations in the dominant network have preferences about the
world, what matters for institutional change are their beliefs about how the world works. It
is their beliefs about how institutions affect political and economic outcomes that matter,
because it is through these beliefs that they determine which institutions would better
suit their interest. Therefore, we must discuss better what we mean by beliefs.
Beliefs
As stressed by North (2005) ”the reality of a political-economic system is never know to
anyone,” therefore humans create mental models to deal with reality. Given that we have
an imperfect perception of reality and we live in a non-ergodic world, there is no tendency
toward perfect mental models. These mental models, are both positive and normative, i.e,
a mental model is composed of beliefs about how the world is and how it should be.
(ALSTON et al., 2016) focus on positive beliefs, and in particular what they call
core beliefs.21 Core beliefs are beliefs about how institutions affect political and economic
outcomes. In almost no moment of time all the members of a given society will have the
same beliefs, but what matter for us are the beliefs of those with enough power to affect
institutions, because it’s their beliefs that will guide institutional change.(NORTH, 2005,
p. 2) (ALSTON et al., 2016, pgs. 227 - 232) Nevertheless, the beliefs of population at large
can work as an additional constraint to the feasible institutional choice-set for the elites.
And in societies with binding constitutions, courts or previous institutions may also work
as a constraint, or at least as barrier to be overcome, and popular pressure can affect the
composition of the dominant network.(ALSTON, 2017)22
21 In the remaining of the text everywhere I speak about beliefs, I am thinking about core beliefs.
22 It is implicit in this argument that the beliefs of the elite are at least compatible with a society’s
Beliefs are highly contextual, therefore the dominant network in different societies
may have different beliefs. For the framework, it is not really important what is the origin
of the dominant beliefs, but how they change or are reinforced. This is better analyzed
when we discuss the dynamic aspect of the framework.By now we just state that beliefs
get reinforced when they generate the expected outcomes, and therefore can be seen as
a good approximation of reality. Moreover, if the the outcomes generated are good for
skeptical groups, they may be convinced of the necessity of the current institution and
the soundness of the current beliefs.
Windows of Opportunity
Institutions are put in place to structure human interaction and diminish the uncertainty
of human environment.(NORTH, 2005) Moreover, the organizations existent or at least
those in the dominant network, have stakes in the current society’s institutional arrange-
ment. Therefore, it is not surprise that institutions rarely goes through dramatic changes.
But there are moments when the formal rules of a country does change, in such a dramatic
way that even affect the political and economic trajectory of that society. This process of
change is called a Critical Transition, and the (not so) rare moments when this process
can begin are called Windows of Opportunity.
”Windows of opportunity are historical occasions when there is a chance to change
the trajectory of a country’s economic and political outcomes by changing beliefs and
institutions.”(ALSTON et al., 2016, pg. 223) These are the moments when there is some
problem of coordination inside the dominant network, or some sock causes a change in
the composition of the network or in the dominant beliefs. These moments can be caused
by many factors such as:
• There are unexpected rents gains to be seized, or the rental stream falls short of the
expected by some of the organizations in the dominant network. Regardless of the
cause, the coalition becomes a non-adherent organization.
• Some political or economic shock changes the configuration of the dominant network,
therefore changing the political equilibrium inside the dominant network.
• Beliefs of some members of the network change, due to a considerable change in
political or economic outcomes, or because of an external event.
• Pure political entrepreneurship. Some individual or organization may have such
gains to realize in a possible institutional change that they would make the necessary
effort to create a window of opportunity.
culture, because they are important in determining the observed outcomes. And rules without any
relationship to the society’s culture would generate unexpected, and maybe undesired, outcomes.
A window of opportunity may be caused by any of these motives, a combination
of them, or even a cause not considered above. The point is that it is a moment where
a process that will engender profound changes in the society’s political and economical
trajectory, and involves a substantial change in the dominant beliefs begins. It is just the
starting point of a change. Many windows of opportunity go unrealized or are just partially
exploited.23 In many moments, the full exploitation of a window of opportunity makes
necessary the coordination of a new dominant coalition, and many times it is necessary
the action of a leader, or some, to solve the collective action problem and form a new
dominant network with a correspondent new dominant belief system.
Leadership
To emphasize the role of leadership in a theory of institutional change is not to adopt
a ”big man” perspective of history, but to recognize that ”certain individuals at certain
moments in a country’s history make a difference because of their actions.”(ALSTON et
al., 2016, pg. 233) Many times, these actions are key in initiating institutional and beliefs
change, or in deepening new beliefs and institutions. The leadership in a given window
of opportunity may be exercised by an individual, but usually this role is played by a
group of individuals, each showing different attributes, such as: cognition, coordination,
adaptability, and moral authority. (ALSTON, 2017)
• Cognition can be divided in two aspects:
1. The leader(s) must perceive that a change is possible, i.e., she must be aware
of the window of opportunity.
2. She must know how to take advantage of the situation,i.e., have a set of institu-
tional change that she believes that will enhance the situation of the members
of the (new) dominant network.
• Coordination is the capability to make the relevant players to follow the leader’s
ideas. It is necessary to create coordination between the (possible) new elite, creating
a situation where the majority is compelled to act in the same direction, therefore
avoiding the collective-action problem.
• Adaptability is the capability and willingness to react to downstream consequences,
usually using political or economical side-payments to keep the coalition. It is the
ability to keep the coalition, even when there realized rental stream diverge from
the expected.
• Moral authority gives the leader legitimacy, enhancing his persuasion power and can
help in the coordination effort.
23 ”Revolutions are never so revolutionary as desired.”(NORTH, 1990)
The main role of leaders is to perceive the window of opportunity and to coordinate
a network of organizations with an alternative belief system, and direct them through the
process of institutional and belief deepening. This process is better discussed in the next
section where we focus in the dynamic aspect of the framework.
International relations
One additional aspect necessary for understanding the period analyzed is the role that
Great Britain had in many of the institutional choices of the period. As it will be made
clear throughout the historical narrative, it is impossible to think about this period with-
out considering the pressure and influence exercised by England over Portugal and Brazil
in different moments.
Tamayo (2014) used this framework for understanding Ecuador development and
also found necessary to consider the influence of the great power of the moment, United
States in Ecuador’s case. So this may be a hint that when analyzing the institutional
evolution in countries in development, it is mandatory to consider the possible influence
of powerful foreign countries that can affect the balance of power in minor countries, and
therefore influence the politic and economic choices that are made.
1.3.2 The dynamics
Above we discussed the main elements of the framework, now we discuss how we use
them to understand and interpret reality. This discussion is divided in two parts, first we
define and discuss ”autopilot,” i.e., the situation in the majority of time when there is
just marginal changes to institutions. The other concept is the ”Critical Transition,” those
rare moments when profound institutional change is observed, these are moments when
the institutional change is such, that the society’s political and/or economical trajectory
are affected.
Autopilot
One remarkable, but not surprisingly, characteristic of institutions is how stable they
are. In most of the time the institutional structure of a given society does not change,
or change just marginally. This is not a surprise because the members of the dominant
network realize gains that are possible due to the current institutions. Moreover, as noted
by North (1990), there are incentives to rationalize the current organization of society,
and creating theories to explain bad outcomes.24 In these moments institutional change
is only marginal, and in the direction of deepening the current structure, i.e., making
24 See for example how Nicola´s Maduro always explain the bad outcomes in Venezuela making reference
to some kind of sabotage or international conspiracy.
changes that favor the current elite and reinforcing the current situation. This is a society
in institutional autopilot and the situation is depicted in figure 2. The absence of sub-
stantial changes in autopilot times does not imply that the majority of population and
organizations in this society are happy with the actual outcomes. This just means that the
rental stream is such that most of the organizations within the dominant network accepts
this as the better deal that they can get now. The same is valid for the population at
large. It is possible that there is much discontentment in the population, but they just
accept the situation as being ”how the world works.”
It is useful to think see a society in autopilot as a society in a path-equilibrium.
This meaning that the dominant beliefs are stable, showing just minor and sporadic
changes, and the institutions show gradual changes. These marginal changes in beliefs
and institutions do not affect the overall political and economic trajectory of the society.
But if this were the whole story, we would still be stuck in the social organizations that
emerged following the Neolithic Revolution,25 and a framework about institutional change
wouldn’t be necessary. Therefore, let’s turn our attention to those unusual moments where
a society goes through substantial change in its dominant beliefs and consequently in its
institutions.
Critical Transitions
There are moments when due to an external or internal shock, the society moves out of
its current equilibrium and a window of opportunity is open. As discussed above, these
are moments when considerable changes in the dominant beliefs are possible, and when
one of these opportunities is seized it’s possible that a critical transition will begin. A
Critical Transition is a process of significant institutional and belief change in a society,
and if ”completed” leads a society to a new political and economical equilibrium.26
If the shock to the system is sufficiently strong, the society moves out of the current
equilibrium, at least temporary, and the dominant beliefs enter in check. Maybe some new
organization gained de jure political power, or the rental stream fell short of expected by
some organizations that comes to believe that a institutional change is more in their
interest than the status quo. Whatever the reason, there is space for a new belief system
to become the dominant one. If the new coalition seizes the power, new institutions are
put in place reflecting the change in the dominant beliefs, and to institutionalize the new
balance of political power. These changes can generate a constitutional moment, when
there are changes in the constitutional level codifying the new belief system.
It is important to note that a critical transition is not an one-time event, but an
25 And I wouldn’t spending days worrying about an Economics dissertation.
26 There is nothing to guarantee that this new equilibrium is better to the society at large. It is seen as
better just for those members in the new dominant network.
iterative process that takes time, and usually involves the action of leaders, that works
to spread a new dominant belief and solve the problem of collective action inside the new
dominant network. Moreover, the coalition must be rent-incentive, therefore the outcomes
must be within the expectation of the new elite. If the outcomes are close to the expected,
the belief in them are reinforced and usually makes room for more institutional change.
If this process of belief and institutional deepening is profound enough, the society moves
to a new equilibrium, when it enters again in an autopilot but now with a new dominant
belief.
Figure 3 depicts a society going through a critical transition. The dotted lines show
situations that may happen, but are not strictly necessary. The double direction in the
arrow between Leadership and Window of Opportunity shows that usually leadership is
necessary for a window of opportunity to be fully exploited and that a leader himself may
create one. If a leader seizes the opportunity, the society goes through a change in the
dominant belief, by changing the balance of power within the dominant network, changing
the composition of the network or by a change in their beliefs. Regardless of the cause, the
new dominant belief system if codified in a constitutional moment, and if the outcomes
are within expectations, there is a process of institutional and belief deepening. If the
process goes through sufficient iterations the society moves back to the world depicted
in figure 2, but with a new dominant belief and probably with different economic and
political characteristics.
Figure 2 – Institutional evolution in the Autopilot
Source: Alston et al. (2018)
Figure 3 – Institutions going through a Critical Transition
Source: Alston et al. (2018)
2 From Colony to a ”Backward Parliamen-
tary” Monarchy: 1808 - 1847
From now on, we delve deep into Brazilian history to construct a thick description of its
institutional evolution. The goal is not to describe each and any event that happened
throughout the period but to show the co-evolution between institutions and the core
beliefs of the society. Here we apply the aforementioned framework to analyze the process
of independence of Brazil and its subsequent institutional organization. As we discussed
above, institutions tend to show path-dependence, therefore to understand the indepen-
dence process we must first to have at least a rough idea of the situation in place when the
process towards independence began. So, we begin by laying out what was the situation
in Brazil in the final years of the the colonial period.
2.1 The late colonial period
2.1.1 The Colonial pact
Colonial pact is a generic term used to describe the set of rules that a colonizer country
used to regulate its relationship with the colonies. Even though the economic side of
these rules tends to be emphasized, the colonial pact usually encompasses each and every
aspect of the colony’s organization, going from its foreign policy to its educational policies.
Although each colonizing country had its own set of colonial policies, that were enforced
with a varying degree of success, these policies were used to achieve two common goals
shared by every colonizing country: To secure the colonial ties between the metropolis
and colony and to maximize the economic gains that could be extracted from each colony.
These goals reflected the underlying belief that the interests of the colonizing country had
precedence over the interest of its colonies.
By the end of XIX century, the policies adopted by Portugal towards its American
territory reflected not only the underlying colonial mentality but also the fact that Portu-
gal’s economic health relied heavily on the riches generated by the provinces of Brazil. In
the commercial side, all Brazilian foreign commerce was directed by Portugal, i.e, Portugal
was the entrepoˆt for all Brazilian imports and exports. Of course, there was contraband,
given the value of the goods and the lack of capacity to police all the Brazilian coastal
area. As an example of the effort put in place to guarantee Portugal’s privilege in Brazilian
commerce we reproduce below a decree issued in 18thcentury towards British merchants:
”Como a` Bahia e ao Rio de Janeiro concorresem navios ingleses que para
o Brasil levavam mercadorias da Europa e da I´ndia e de la´ tiravam muito ouro
e tabaco, determinou-se, pelo Alvara´ de 8 de fevereiro de 1711, que os gover-
nadores das conquistas na˜o admitissem nos portos delas navio algum ingleˆs
ou de qualquer outra nac¸a˜o estrangeira, a na˜o ser que fossem incorporados
nas frotas do reino e com elas voltassem, na forma dos tratados, ou quando
entrassem abrigando-se de alguma tempestade ou falta de mantimentos.”1 (SI-
MONSEN, 2005, pg. 454)
The fact that this decree cites directly British ships is symptomatic, given that
Great Britain had much influence over Portugal in this period. Therefore, this shows that
Portugal was really concerned about the access of any foreign country to the Brazilian
market and goods. The willingness to adopt such measures also reflect the huge gains that
the Crown and the Portuguese people had with the Brazilian foreign commerce. Consider
the maritime commerce, for example, the Portuguese ships gained from the freights, the
custom houses gained with the Brazilian imports, and also with the re-exports of foreign
manufactures to Brazil. (SIMONSEN, 2005)
Brazil was a supplier of tropical goods to the European market and of raw materials
to Portuguese manufactures, of which Brazil should also be a consumer market. This is
the rationale underlying most of the economic colonial policies, as exemplified by the
draconian decree enacted by D. Maria I in 1785 prohibiting any manufacture effort in
Brazil:
Alvara´ de 5 de janeiro de 1785
”Eu a Rainha fac¸o saber aos que este Alvara´ virem: Que sendo-me presente o
grande nu´mero de Fa´bricas, e Manufacturas, que de alguns annos a esta parte
se tem diffundido em differentes Capitanias do Brasil, com grave preju´ızo da
Cultura, e da Lavoura, e da explorac¸a˜o das Terras Mineraes daquelle vasto
Continente;[...] Hei por bem Ordenar, que todas as Fabricas, Manufacturas,
ou Teares de Galo˜es, de Tecidos, ou de Bordados de Ouro, e Prata: De Vel-
ludos, Brilhantes, Setins, Tafeta´s, ou de outra qualquer qualidade de Seda:
De Belbutes, Chitas, Bombazinas, Fusto˜es, ou de outra qualquer qualidade de
fazenda de Algoda˜o, ou de Linho, branca ,ou de cores: E de Pannos, Baetas,
Droquetes, Saetas, ou de outra qualquer qualidade de Tecidos de La˜, ou os
1 ”As to Bahia and Rio de Janeiro were traveling British ships which brought goods from Europe and
India to Brazil, and from there drew much gold and tobacco, it was determined by the Decree of
February 8, 1711, that the colony’s governors did not admit at their ports any English ships or from
any other nation, unless they were incorporated in the fleets of the kingdom and returned with them
in the form of treaties, or when they entering seeking refuge from some storm or lack of provisions.”
ditos Tecidos seja˜o fabricados de hum so´ dos referidos Generos, ou mistura-
dos, e tecidos huns com os outros; exceptuando ta˜o so´mente aquelles dos ditos
Teares, e Manufacturas, em que se te´cem, ou manufactura˜o Fazendas grossas
de Algoda˜o, que servem para o uso, e vestuario dos Negros, Para enfar-dar,
e empacotar Fazendas, e para outros Ministerios semelhantes; todas as mais
seja˜o extinctas, e abolidas em qualquer parte onde se acharem nos Meus Do-
minios do Brasil[...]”2 - (NOVAIS, 1966)
These economic policies reflected the aforementioned goals of using the colony to
enhance the Metropole’s economic situation and to keep the colonial ties. But, as previ-
ously mentioned, the colonial policies were not restricted to the commercial and economic
sphere. In Brazil, the existence of printing presses was not allowed and even the mere
presence of foreigners was seen with distrust in the period. Even Brazilian educational
policy was heavily restricted by Portugal, mass education was seen as undesired by the
Metropole and no University or institution of higher learning was allowed in Brazil.
As there was no institution of higher learning in Brazil, any Brazilian that desired
to get a degree had to go to the University of Coimbra; this was seen by the Crown as
”one of the strongest link that keeps the colonies’ dependency.”(LACOMBE, 2003) As a
side effect of this policy, the Brazilian intellectual elite acquired a similar training; this
similarity was reinforced by the fact that most of them studied civil law. This, combined
with the Portuguese policy that tried to accommodate the Brazilian elite by enabling
their participation in the State bureaucracy3 , led to the emergence of a homogeneous
political elite, with similar ideological basis and experience in state affairs.4 It is also
important to note that a form of Brazilian national identity was another side effect of
this necessity for studying in Coimbra, the common experience made this group create
links between them and surpass or at least diminish the regionalism that existed in Brazil,
2 “I, the Queen, will make clear to everyone that sees this Decree: That coming to my knowledge the
great number of factories and manufactures, that from some years have been installed in distinct
Brazilian captaincies, with great lost to the agriculture, farming, and mineral exploration from that
vast continent; [. . . ] [I] decided to demand that any manufacture or loom, of woven, gold embroidery,
silver; of velvet, brilliant, satins, taffetas, or any other quality of silk; of calicoes, bombazine, or any
other quality of cotton fabric or linen, white or colored; or other wool fabrics, or the woven Fabrics be
manufactured of just one of the aforesaid Kinds, or blended and woven with each other; with exception
for those of such looms and manufactures which make rough cotton fabrics, that are use for clothing
the Negroes, to package the farm products, or for similar uses; all the more be extinct, and abolished
in any part of my Domains of Brazil[. . . ]” Our translation
3 HAMNETT, B. R. Process and Pattern : A Re-examination of the Ibero-American Independence.
Journal of Latin American Studies, Cambridge University Press, v. 29, p. 279–328, 1977.
4 Pang e Seckinger (1972) argue that this group of literates can be seen as the ”Brazilian mandarins”.
Mandarins are defined as a group of political agents recruited and trained to exercise the role of
administrating and unifying a country, forging a national ideology and justifying the continuation of
the political and economic status quo. It seems to match the role played by Brazilian Coimbra-trained
political elite during the process of Independence, even though this political elite emerged as a side
effect of a colonial policy.
given the lack of political integration between the provinces. The homogeneity and new
national perspective will have an important role in the idiosyncratic nature of Brazil’s
Independence and posterior form of government. (CARVALHO, 1982)
Brazilian export-oriented production system was based on slave labor, that by
the end of the 18th century was mostly composed of black people brought from Africa.
Slavery had such an acceptance in Brazil that even the Church and free black men had
slaves.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018) Another key aspect of Brazil’s internal organi-
zation in this period is that there was strong political autonomy between the provinces.
This, in part, reflected a direct Portuguese colonial policy that sought to keep the ties
between the provinces weak and encouraged direct communication with Lisbon. (LYRA,
1994) And the situation was not helped by geographical factors, such as the wind di-
rection that made easier for the north of the territory com communicate with Portugal
that with the colony’s capital city at this moment, Salvador, or the difficulty of inland
travels.(SKIDMORE, 1999, pgs. 12 - 13) As a consequence of these policies and the ge-
ographic factors, there were almost no political links between the provinces with each of
them directing themselves, without any influence from the general government established
in the capital.(CARVALHO, 1982)
Despite this lack of political integration, the same cannot be said about the econ-
omy. The mining industry stimulated the occupation of the interior of Brazil and the
creation of access routes to the coastal cities. Moreover, livestock creation and cattle
commerce created links between the main economic poles of Brazil: The sugar industry
in the northeast and the mining industry in Minas Gerais. These economic links are im-
portant when analyzing why Portuguese America became a unique country and not many
as the Spanish colonies. Take for example the case of Rio Grande do Sul,Carvalho (1982)
argues that the main cause of why it did not secede from Brazil was their need of access
to Brazilian internal market.5
Notwithstanding all the restrictive colonial policies, Brazil became vital to the
economic health of the Portuguese Empire. At the beginning of the 19th century, 60.76%
of the Empire exports came from Brazil, and just 27.43% from Portugal. Moreover, 83%
of goods imported by Portugal came from Brazil.(RUSSELL-WOOD, 1987, pgs. 281 -282)
Brazil had become the most important economic unit in the Empire, and in some way
had already achieved a de facto economic autonomy.(SIMONSEN, 2005)
Summing up what we discussed up to here. Before the arrival of the Royal Fam-
ily, there was no recognizable notion of Brazilian national identity, excepting for that
group of students in Coimbra that by the common experience developed a similar ideol-
ogy and started to surpass the strong regionalism present in Brazil. The most powerful
5 This need is exemplified by the fact that the desire for protection from foreign competitors would be
one of the triggers for the major revolt that broke out in the 1830s.
group in Brazil was the big slave owners and slaveholders. These oligarchs used their
economic power to nurture a close relationship with the Crown and amassed much local
power.(SKIDMORE, 1999) By this time, it was already clear that the Brazilian provinces
did not need Portugal for economic survival, and maybe Portugal was already incapable of
being the entrepoˆt that Brazil needed. Regardless of this, there were no clear signs in 1806
that the colonial ties between Portugal and colonial Brazil were in risk, possibly because
of the lack of political integration between the provinces.(SIMONSEN, 2005) Despite the
lack of political links, there were economic links, at least thin ones, between some of the
provinces, or how Carvalho (1982) puts it ”the country was not an economic archipelago.”
2.2 The arrival of the Royal Family; its institutional and cultural
effects
Portugal, that had historically profited by keeping itself neutral during the recurring Eu-
ropean wars of the period was in a different and fragile situation in 1806. The War between
Great Britain and Napoleonic France was in its height; given the incapability of invading
the British Isles, Napoleon decided to weaken its enemy by strangling its commerce, by
closing all the European ports to any English ship. And by mid-1807 the only country
with its ports still open to British ships was Portugal, that was working as the entry
point of British goods to the European market. Realizing that the blockade would be
effective only with the participation of Portugal, Napoleon issued an ultimatum demand-
ing that the Portuguese aligned themselves with the rest of Continental Europe and also
close their ports to English goods or it would be invaded. But not only was Portugal a
long-time ally of Great Britain, as the regent prince knew that accepting French demands
would probably imply the lost of Portugal’s overseas domains. To complete this puzzle,
the position of Great Britain was clear: If Portugal hold to the alliance, the British navy
would provide protection to the Braganc¸a dynasty and support a transatlantic migration,
but if Portugal decided to side with France, the same Fleet that would give protection
in case of a voyage to America would instead destroy the Portuguese fleet and probably
seize Portugal’s colonies.(BETHELL, 1970, p. 8)
We have discussed before how important was Brazil to Portugal’s financial health,
therefore the possibility of losing this territory probably was seen as catastrophic by the
prince regent. But, regardless of what drove the final decision in November 1807, the
Royal family and the entire Portuguese court fled with the support of the British navy
from an imminent invasion from Portugal by the French Army. With the Royal family
came between 10000 to 15000 people, bringing with them approximately 50% of all the
circulating currency in Portugal at the time.(SIMONSEN, 2005, p. 500) (GOMES, 2007)
It is not our goal here to discuss the impact of this in Portugal, but it is interesting to
note that the loss of such amount of currency and posterior shipments made to Brazil can
be seen as a cause of economic hardships in Portugal.(ARRUDA, 2000)
Even though this voyage was put in motion only after strong British pressure and
the beginning of the French invasion, the moving of the Portuguese court to Brazil for the
creation of a new and powerful Portuguese empire was an old utopia in Portugal as well
explained by Lyra (1994). But how this transaction was put in place is a good example
of a regular feature in the first part of 19th century in Brazil where some key policies
would be put in place only due to strong British pressure, some times this pressure even
escalating to open threats.6 This influence that Great Britain would have over Brazil
throughout the first part of the 19th century began with the transatlantic migration of
the Braganc¸a family.Being basically an extension of the influence that Great Britain had
over Portugal, and such influence was reinforced by the key role that the UK played in
the transmigration of the court from the old Metropole to its biggest colony.
In January 1808, the Royal Family and the court reached Brazil; and as soon
as the Prince Regent Joa˜o reached Brazil, he began to make institutional reforms for
the re-organization of the Portuguese Empire, or better said, for the creation of a new
Luso-Brazilian Empire.
One of the first and most important measures taken by Dom Joa˜o VI was the
opening of the Brazilian ports to ships of all friendly nations which in 1808 meant Great
Britain. Even though this reflected a necessary measure, given that Portugal was occupied
by the French army and therefore incapable of exercising its role as colonial entrepoˆt, it
put an end to the old colonial system, by dismantling one of its fundamental institu-
tions.(PEDREIRA, 2000)
But the dismissal of the old colonial commercial system was not the only measure
taken by Dom Joa˜o. He took other measures that signaled the break of the colonial ties,
as the permission to create medical schools in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia, the revoke of
the decree banning the presence of manufactures or foreigners in Brazil, and even the new
efforts towards the economic and political integration of the Brazilian provinces.(LYRA,
1994) Therefore, it is with merits that the coming of the Royal family to Brazil and the
subsequent measures are seen as the de facto emancipation of Brazil from the colonial
rule.(LYRA, 1994) (CUNHA, 2010)
The flee from Europe meant that now the Braganc¸a family was completely depen-
dent on Great Britain for defending not only their colonies but also their country. This
position of dependency combined with the indebtedness due to the ”protection” offered
during the transatlantic migration explains the favorable terms given to the British when
Portugal and Great Britain signed the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that estab-
6 The best example of this is the process of abolition of the slave trade in Brazil, that only happened
after years of British pressure. See a discussion of the process in Bethell (1970).
lished a preferential import tax for British goods, that had as consequence the flooding
of the small Brazilian market with British goods, a situation that inhibited any possible
growth of Brazilian manufacture.7 Also, the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship was signed
and had as one of its clauses a sign of the approval of measures towards the end of the
African Slave Trade.8
Even though the British had a prominent role, eventually ships from other nations
also arrived in Brazil and with the presence of ships from different nations came the contact
with foreign people and new ideas. This not only lead to a ”cultural awakening”, but also
lead to a better perception of the Crown and the Metropole in general.(HOLANDA, 2010)
Therefore, we can speak not only about political and economic emancipation but also of
a cultural emancipation. The colonial times were over, and Brazil, that was already the
most important economic center of the Empire became also its political center.(RUSSELL-
WOOD, 1987, pg. 283)
This process of political, economic, and cultural emancipation is institutionalized
in 1815 with the elevation of Brazil to the status of Kingdom, and the creation of the
United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves. But it is important to note that
the transposition of the Royal Court to Brazil did not mean that substantial change
happened to the internal organization of the society, but only that the old bureaucracy
had a new seat.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018) In the same way that the magistrates
formed the backbone of the Portuguese State, they would be the political elite of the
new Luso-Brazilian Empire and they are going to be important players in the process of
Independence.(CARVALHO, 1982)(SCHWARTZ, 1970)
The arrival of the Portuguese Royal Family was a shock to the old colonial equi-
librium. The institutional reforms not only broke the colonial pact but also made any
possible acceptance of the colonial status obsolete and impossible to maintain. The gen-
eral perception about the reforms that culminated in the elevation of Brazil to the status
of kingdom was that Rio had became the Metropole and Portugal a simple province, or
even worse to the Portuguese people, the colony, as it is possible to see in the commentary
below, written by the abbot De Pradt in 1817:
”Portugal na˜o tinha mais coloˆnia; pois ele pro´pio se transformara em
coloˆnia. A metro´pole na˜o esta´ mais em Portugal, e daqui em diante na˜o e´ mais
em Portugal que se deve procura´-la. Ela passou para a Ame´rica e a coloˆnia
ficou na Europa. As antigas relac¸o˜es do Brasil com Portugal, tornou-se bem
evidente, que foram invertidas”9 (LYRA, 1994, pgs. 143 -144)
7 One key aspect of this Treaty is that it could be revised in fifteen years.
8 Betthel1970
9 “Portugal no longer had a colony; because itself became a colony. The metropolis is no longer in
Portugal, and henceforth it is no longer in Portugal that one should look for it. It went to t Americas
In some way, the transmigration of the Portuguese royal family not only puts an
end to the colonial pact but is also the last note of the Portuguese Empire, or at least a
considerable interregnum. All the reforms put in place from the moment of the arrival of
the court to the moment of its return to Portugal reflected an effort to create in Rio de
Janeiro and Brazil the necessary structure, be it physical or political, to be the capital
and main country of the the new empire of the Braganc¸as, the Luso-Brazilian Empire;
the elevation of Brazil to the status of Kingdom was only a formal recognition of this.
But, while the project of this new empire was cherished in Brazil, it was seen as
a misfortune in Portugal.(LYRA, 1994) With the break of the colonial pact, not only
Portugal lost the honor of being the Government’s seat as it also lost its commercial
privileges in relation to Brazil’s market and goods.(SIMONSEN, 2005) That’s why as
soon as Portugal became free of the French occupation in 1812, the clamor for the King’s
return began. In 1815, the same year that Brazil was elevated to the status of a kingdom,
the war in Europe that had been the ultimate cause of the migration of the Portuguese
court came to an end with the definitive defeat of Napoleon. But Dom Joa˜o VI did not
answer to the clamors. He only listened to the clamors when a revolution erupted in
Portugal that threatened his seat as king of Portugal.
2.3 The Liberal Revolution and Brazilian Independence
In 1820 the ”Liberal” revolution erupted in Porto and spread to other Portuguese cities.
The revolutionaries demanded the immediate return of the King, and that he accept a
constitution that would be drafted by an elected body.They were called liberals because
they demanded the installation of a constitutional monarchy in Portugal. Initially the
Brazilian elite greeted the Liberal Revolution in Portugal with optimism and support.
This is evidenced by the fact that Dom Joa˜o VI was made to swear the to-be drafted con-
stitution while residing in Brazil.This happened because the same liberalism that was fuel
to the Porto Revolution was present in Brazil, but what Brazilians failed to perceive in
a first moment was that the liberalism of Portuguese Cortes was combined with a strong
anti-Brazilian attitude. Not only did they desire that Brazil cease to be considered a King-
dom but also the re-establishment of the old colonial commercial practices.(HOLANDA,
2010) In sum, the Cortes desired a return to the old colonial times and were not willing
to compromise.
The Brazilian dominant network, composed of the big landowners and the man-
darins, desired autonomy but wanted to keep the ties with Portugal, and consequently
with Europe. A return to the old colonial status would mean a lost of economic oppor-
and the colony remained in Europe. The old ties between Brazil and Portugal, became very evident,
that were inverted.” Our translation
tunities for the agrarian elite, because they would lose direct access to other European
markets beyond Portugal, and the intellectual elite could not accept a regress to the old
status. Moreover, even Great Britain, the old time ally of Portugal did not desire a return
to the colonial times, because this would mean that the role exercised by them of selling
Brazilian products in Europe would return to the Portuguese.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING,
2018, chapter 8) (SHAW, 1928)
Even though the Cortes’ intransigence would be at least instrumental in the drive
towards Independence, this idea was already in the Brazilian imaginary in the beginnings
of the 1820’s. As is exemplified by these verses, that Cunha (2010) states were popular in
Brazil around 1821:
”Inda que na˜o fosse herdeiro
Seja ja´ Pedro Primeiro.”10
”Seja nosso Imperador
Com governo liberal
De cortes, franco e legal
mas nunca nosso Senhor.”11
These verses represent the emerging belief in an independent and liberal Brazil
that would be reinforced by the decisions taken by the Cortes. Initially the Brazilian
elite desired autonomy with equal status with Portugal, in some way a continuation of
the situation formalized in 1815, but the anti-Brazilian stance adopted by the Cortes
forced them to accept the reality that the desired autonomy would not be attainable
while keeping institutional links with Portugal.
What the Portuguese Cortes failed to perceive was that the the return to the old
colonial status was not possible, because the institutional reforms carried out after Dom
Joa˜o VI arrival, created a de facto independent Brazil, and the Brazilian elite believed
in that, therefore no relegation of status would be acceptable. Given that autonomy with
equal status was not accepted by the Cortes, and the colonial status was not compatible
with the self-perception of Brazilians, Independence was the unique possible path.
2.4 The Independence and the aftermath
As discussed in the last section, around 1820 the belief in a liberal and independent Brazil
was already present. But it co-survived with the belief in the union with Portugal. An
10 ”Even if you were not heir, Be now Pedro I” Our translation
11 ”Be our emperor, with liberal government. With cortes, honest and legal, but never our lord. Our
translation
evidence of this is that the defense of the union was the main theme of the directions
that Jose´ Bonifa´cio, the patriarch of the Independence, gave to the representatives of
Sa˜o Paulo in the Cortes.(FAORO, 2001)But the intransigence of the Cortes made this
belief obsolete and strengthened the alternative. In this way, it is possible to see the anti-
Brazilian actions by the Cortes as a shock that undermined the institutional structure
in place, and therefore created a window of opportunity for considerable institutional
change.
Given the degree of political and economic autonomy that Brazil had achieved in
the first two decades of the 19th century, the Cortes’ cause was a hopeless one, and the real
institutional question created by this window of opportunity was what would be the shape
of Brazilian independence, a monarchic system or a republican one. The deliberate choice
made by the intellectual elite was for a Constitutional Monarchy. They believed that this
was the only way to avoid the disintegration of Brazil in smaller countries, as happened to
the former Spanish America. Moreover, this choice was a national unanimity, because the
belief in monarchy was widely accepted by the population at large.(CARVALHO, 2003)
(CUNHA, 2010) So, the idiosyncratic path of Brazilian independence reflected society’s
underlying belief.
One important aspect of the main framework is the role of leadership in directing a
society through a window of opportunity, and in the process of independence and consoli-
dation in 1820’s this role was performed by the Brazilian political elite. Even though Jose´
Bonifa´cio was prominent having much influence over Dom Pedro through his period as de
facto prime minister, the process of consolidation of national integrity and of a Liberal
Empire will be the work of the political elite at large.(CARVALHO, 2003) and(PANG;
SECKINGER, 1972) As previously discussed, this political and intellectual elite shared a
common ideology acquired through similar academic training and professional experience.
This ideology emphasized the relationship with the Crown and the unity of the Empire.
And in the first years of the Empire, they are going to be the architects of Brazilian
integration under a monarch, therefore warranting their definition as the ”mandarins of
Imperial Brazil.”(PANG; SECKINGER, 1972)
Given that a Monarchy implies a king, the elite sought the Prince Regent’s support
for the national cause. This effort involved acts like the gathering of signatures clamoring
for his stay and his designation as ”Brazil’s Perpetual Defender.”12 So, it was with the
support of this intellectual elite and as an answer to another anti-Brazilian decree issued
by the Cortes that in September 7, 1822, Dom Pedro declared the Independence of Brazil.
The Independence did not change the political organization of the country, just
giving new colors to an old structure. In the same way that the magistrates had been the
backbone of the Portuguese and of the Luso-Brazilian Empires, the Brazilian intellectual
12 For a better discussion about the efforts realized by the elite see Cunha (2010, pgs. 185 - 202)
elite would be the political elite and the backbone of the new country.(COSTA, 2010) But,
as the big landowners and slaveholders had much regional power and formed the fiscal
basis of the new State, the literate could only govern and achieve their goals in alliance
with this rural elite. Moreover, in many moments the intellectuals themselves were part
of this rural elite. Therefore, the window of opportunity was seized by those that already
were powerful in Colonial Brazil, therefore the ”new” dominant network, had nothing new
at all.
The political power of the rural class is better demonstrated by the absence of
any discussion about the end of slavery during the process of Independence and of con-
stitutional drafting in 1823, even though Jose´ de Bonifa´cio and, supposedly, the monarch
was openly against slavery and the slave trade. Given that slave labor was the basis of
the Brazilian production system, they resisted even Great Britain’s pressure to end the
transatlantic slave trade, so as not to lose the support of the big landowners for the
monarchy and risking the disintegration of the country.(MAXWELL, 2003, pgs. 163-164)
It is important to reinforce that the fact that the political regime established
following the independence was a monarchy was a deliberate choice of the political elite,
i.e., there were other possible choices of regime and there was nothing that implied that
Brazil should become a monarchy. In reality, given the situation in the Americas, it was
reasonable to assume that the ”Independence would come with or without a king.” Our
point here is that this institutional choice was first and foremost influenced by the shared
ideology between the members of the Brazilian political elite. Their education in Coimbra
and experience in the Imperial bureaucracy created a belief in the institution of monarchy,
and since the beginning the Independence Movement was built around the Prince Regent
Pedro, the future Emperor of Brazil.13
Before moving on, it is important to discuss briefly the role played by Great Britain
in the process of Brazilian Independence.14 As noted before, the return of the colonial
pact between Brazil and Portugal was against British interest because it would mean the
loss of a new consumer market and source of raw goods. Moreover, Great Britain took
some measures that were an indirect support for Brazilian independence. The Portuguese
government asked for support against the insurgent colony, using their treaty where the
British pledged to come to rescue if Portugal was attacked by any external power. But
the British replied stating that a struggle between colony and Metropole was an internal
affair and there, therefore they couldn’t and wouldn’t intervene. Great Britain’s other
action that supported Brazil was the veto for any action of the Holly Alliance15 against
13 This argument is developed in Carvalho (1982).
14 This paragraph is heavily based in Pantalea˜o (2010).
15 The Holy Alliance was an alliance whose members where the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia,
and the Austrian Empire. It was formed after the final defeat of Napoleon and had as goal to suppress
the revolutionary movements that were erupting in Europe.
the independence movement in the Americas. Given the British maritime supremacy this
implied that no European power would intervene in Portugal’s support, and as Portugal
had no real military power at the time, this implied that Brazilian independence would
not suffer a military setback.
The key role that Great Britain exercised in this moment paid off, and as we
are going to see below, the same dominant position that it had in Brazil since 1810
would be in place for years after the independence, as a consequence of the treaties that
Dom Pedro I will sign with the British for the formal recognition of Brazilian Indepen-
dence.(PANTALEA˜O, 2010, pg. 378)
2.4.1 The unfinished constitutional moment
A key moment when a society is going through a critical transition is the process of
codification of the the new belief system, the so-called constitutional moment. In Brazil,
this process began even before the declaration of Independence on September 7, 1822;
in June a general Constitutional Assembly had been convened whose members would be
elected indirectly by the provinces. Ironically, this would be the sole victory of the liberal
members of the Brazilian political elite in this period.
The point of agreement for most members of the Brazilian political elite was
that the new country should be a constitutional monarchy, but the relative status of
the congress and the monarch in this monarchy was a point of struggle. The liberal
group, those that advanced the idea to convene a Constitutional Assembly even before
the declaration of independence, supported the notion that the Sovereign was the ”Peo-
ple’s Opinion,”16 and the King’s authority is ”given” by the people. The other group, the
”realists”, supported the notion that the monarchy and the King’s authority preceded not
only the constitution, but also the independence. And therefore it did not need to rely on
the ”People.” (FAORO, 2001, pa´gs. 319 - 322)
The first struggle between these two groups was if the monarch should pledge to
accept the to-be drafted Constitution. The liberals defended that in the same ceremony
that Dom Pedro would be declared Emperor he should pledge to obey the Constitution,
in the same way that Dom Joa˜o VI pledged to accept the constitution to be drafted by
the Portuguese Cortes in 1821. The realists, in this moment headed by Jose´ Bonifa´cio,
were strongly against this, supporting that the monarch had the right to give his opinion
during the drafting of the constitution. The outcome of this struggle was that the main
leaders of the liberal group were imprisoned or exiled, and on December 1, 1822, Dom
Pedro I was crowned as Emperor of Brazil, with no mention to the Constitution.
16 In a country plagued with Slavery as Brazil, this meant the minority white elite that had any political
power at all.
On May 3, 1823, the emperor Dom Pedro I opened the Constitutional Assembly,
and at his opening discourse, he made it clear that he would accept the constitution
to be drafted only if he agreed with the text, or as he put ”if it[the constitution] was
worthy of Brazil and himself”. This was only a hint of the despotic inclinations that the
monarch had, even though he declared himself a liberal. Most of the elected members for
the constitutional assembly were liberals, but this group was really representative of the
political elite. This is shown by the fact that from the one hundred elected, in the future
33 would become senators, 28 ministers, 7 members of State’s council, 4 regents, and
18 presidents of provinces.(CUNHA, 2010) Nevertheless, on November 12, Dom Pedro I,
with the Army’s support, dissolved the constitutional assembly and decided to convoke
himself a group to draft a constitution to the new Empire.
In 1824, Dom Pedro I imposed a constitution to the new Empire. This new consti-
tution did not ignore the works realized by the Constitutional Assembly, and was drafted
by a group on ten Brazilians, selected by the monarch who presided over the sessions.
This Magna Carta was dubious, as if reflecting the dubious nature of the emperor him-
self. The Letter of 24 had a surprisingly liberal regulation of the franchise. Even though it
established censitary suffrage, the economic requirements were low enough to enable even
the free but poor to have the right to vote.(CARVALHO, 2008, chapter 1) But the real
innovation was the creation of the Moderator Power, that was private to the monarch.
This gave to the emperor the right to appoint and depose ministers without consulting
the Parliament, the right to select the presidency of the provinces, and to dissolve the
chamber of deputies. In sum, even though Brazil would be a constitutional monarchy, this
constitution would be a weak constraint to the monarch.17
The dual and contradictory nature of the 1824 Constitution reflected an imposed
compromise between the underlying liberal18 beliefs and the monarch’s desire. When Dom
Pedro I chose to interrupt the drafting process, he hindered the codification of the core
beliefs. Even though the constitution had liberal aspects its main characteristic was the
lack of constraints on the monarch. Although Brazil would be a constitutional monarchy
it would not be as liberal as initially desired. But the deposition of the Constitutional
Assembly also marks the begin of the Pedro’s fall from grace. As Cunha (2010) states, in
Brazil Liberalism was irreducible, the coup in 1823 and the subsequent anti-parliamentary
actions that he would take would only reinforce the liberal opposition, and make him lose
the popular support.
17 Even though politically the emperor had much power, Summerhill (2015) states that this same con-
stitution is the explanation for why the Brazilian state could raise external loans and did not default
on its interest payment. One possible interpretation of Summerhill’s argument is that Brazil could
access the loans in spite of the monarchy and because of it.(??, page 8)(FAORO, 2001)
18 It is important to clarify what is this liberalism. This is not the classical liberalism of personal liberties.
This is liberalism is a mere desire for a constitutional government with provincial autonomy.
Another blow to Dom Pedro I’s popularity among Brazilian people was the treaty
of commerce signed in 1827 with Great Britain that meant the formal recognition of
Brazilian independence and the companion convention about slave trade signed and rat-
ified some months before which established that by March 1830 the Slave trade to Brazil
should come to an end. The treaty of commerce had the minimum duration of 15 years
and followed the same lines of the 1810 treaty signed by Dom Joa˜o VI; it established that
British goods would continue to pay a tariff ad valorem of 15% and Brazil could not offer
lower taxes for any other nation. As an answer to this, in 1828 Brazil established this as
a rule, and the goods from any country paid the same tariff. The economic costs of this
treaty for Brazil was considerable, it implied the loss of custom receipts which were the
main source of state revenue in the period and also that Brazilian industry would have
no room for growth and development. The agreements weakened even more Dom Pedro’s
popularity and influenced in the process that lead to his resignation in 1831.
The dynamic that lead to Dom Pedro’s resignation could be the beginning of a
critical transition. Clearly the political outcomes generated by a monarchy were far from
the expected by Brazilian political elite. Therefore, it is possible to see this as a possible
window of opportunity. But the absence of a republican movement and the choice for
Regency meant that this window of opportunity would not be seized. Instead, it would
be a period of institutionalization of the belief in a liberal monarchy. The core beliefs at
the end of the first reign were a combination of the belief in a Constitutional Monarchy
and Slavery.
Through the 1830s and 1840s the slave trade was a point of tension between Brazil
and Great Britain. As noted above, Because of the treaty with Great Britain Brazil had
to put an end to the Atlantic slave trade in 1830; even though a law was enacted in 1831
declaring this infamous trade illegal, it continued mostly undisturbed until 1850 when the
law Euse´bio de Queiroz was signed and the Brazilian government made a real effort to
control this. The question that emerges is how could Brazil resist the British pressure for
putting and end to this for more than two decades? The answer was already given. In the
same way that abolition of slavery was not a part of the conversation in the moment of
Independence for keeping the support of the big farmers, in this moment the dominant
network was a composition of the mandarins of the Empire with political power and
intellectual ascendancy and the big landowners and slaveholders with their economic and
regional power. Given that a dominant network must be incentive-compatible, it was not
feasible to adopt measures in a contrary direction from that desired by the slaveholders,
and this is one of the explanations for why Brazil resisted for so long to the British pressure
to end the Slave.19
19 There was a general belief that Brazilian economy would cease to work without slaves, and given
that the rate of natural increase among slaves in Brazil was negative, this implied the necessity of
continuous importation.
Before proceeding, it is important to revisit our structure. At this key moment in
the institutional organization of the new empire leadership was being exercised by the
magistrates. When we say that their central beliefs were a combination of belief in a
constitutional monarchy and slavery, we are talking that an institutional structure with
these two characteristics was seen as necessary to achieve its objectives, that is, to maintain
the integrity of the Brazilian territory.
2.5 De facto Constitutional moment: 1831 - 1842
The 1823 coup interrupted the process of institutionalization of the constitutional belief
held by the mandarins of the empire, the literate political elite that worked for the In-
dependence. But the ”Revolution of April 7”20 opened a period of institutional reforms
that can be seen as a de facto codification of the dominant network’s beliefs. The Re-
gency years would be marked by many internal revolts what reinforced the belief that the
monarchic institution was indispensable for keeping the unity. The institutional organiza-
tion that emerged from this period, a monarchic regime, with a strong central power and
some provincial autonomy and slavery would form the institutional basis of Brazil until
the proclamation of Republic in 1889.
When Dom Pedro I resigned the throne, in 1831, his son and heir Pedro was 5
years old. And by the laws established in the 1824 constitution he could become the ruler
only when he reached 21 years of age.21 Until he reached adulthood, the 1824 Constitution
established that the country would be ruled by three regents to be elected by the chamber
of deputies and the senate. In practice, this meant that from 1831 onwards the Chamber
of deputies and the Senate would have the power to direct the new country.
In 1831 the Brazilian political elite was divided in three groups: Caramurus, Ex-
alted Liberals, and the Moderate Liberals.22 The Caramurus, also known as restorers be-
cause some of them desired the return of Dom Pedro I to power, supported a strong central
government, roughly in the terms defined by the 1824 Constitution. They dominated the
Senate and by Basile (2010) estimates had 35 deputies. The moderates supported the
monarchy, but desired to reform the government giving more autonomy to the provinces
and more prerogatives to the Chamber of deputies; they were the major group in the
Chamber, with at least 47 deputies. The last, and minor group was the Exalted liberals,
this group desired a federal government and many flirted openly with the idea of a re-
publican government; Even though they had just 7 deputies, their influence over public
20 The resignation of Dom Pedro I
21 One of the changes put in place by the Additional Act is the reduction of the adulthood age to 18
years old.
22 These groups were not organized political parties. Therefore it is complicated to pinpoint their specific
composition.
opinion in the first years of the Regency would have much impact in the path chosen by
the group that would be directing the government in this period.23
As soon as the abdication of Dom Pedro was received, the members of parliament
that were in Rio elected a temporary Regency24. This temporary trine Regency was com-
posed of three senators: Nicolau Pereira de Campos Vergueiro - a liberal and abolitionist
-, Carneiro de Campos - conservative and seen as the main writer of the Constitution of
1824-, and Francisco Lima e Silva - a renowned military leader -. The main actions of this
Regency were to amnesty political prisoners and military men jailed due to desertion, and
to convoke an assembly to draft a new body of laws.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018,
pa´g.247)
2.5.1 The liberal period (1831 - 1837)
On June 17, 1831, the General Legislative Assembly elected a new and permanent trine
Regency, It was composed of the deputies Joa˜o Bra´ulio Muniz(Liberal, and bachelor in
Laws by Coimbra.), Jose´ da Costa Carvalho( Conservative, magistrate and bachelor in
Laws by Coimbra.), and the senator Francisco Lima da Silva. There are some facts to
note about the composition of this Regency. First, it was composed by the Moderates
that were the majority in the Congress; Second, the composition of both trine regencies
was such that the three regions, Center-South, North, and Northeast were represented,
which shows the effort to keep the internal balance of power(DOLHNIKOFF, 2005, p. 89);
Third, the composition of these regencies is one more evidence of our previous point about
the key role of the magistrates and law graduates in the Empire’s formation. From the
first five regents, four held bachelor’s degrees in law at Coimbra, and the only one that
was not a law graduate, senator Lima da Silva, had previous experience as president of
province(Pernambuco). Therefore, that homogeneous group in terms of education and
experience in public service that had a key role in the moment of independence, would
now have the opportunity and responsibility to direct the institutional choices of the
country.[p. 247](SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018)
The first important act of the permanent Regency was the approval of an institu-
tional law regulating the Regency itself. The law gave primacy to the Legislative over the
Executive, limiting the Moderative Power to be exercised by the regents.(DOLHNIKOFF,
2005) It established that any action related to the Moderative Power should have the ref-
erendum from the relevant minister. Moreover, the regents would not have the right to
dissolve the chamber of deputies, to give amnesty, to declare war or ratify treaties. This
23 Basile (2010) investigated the composition of the chamber of deputies during the 1930-1933 legislature.
He identified the position of 79 chamber members, from a total of 129 that exercised the role by any
amount of time throughout this period.
24 The Congress was in recess and few members of the parliament were at the capital,that’s why the
Regency elected had a temporary status.
first institutional change was a clear movement towards a parliamentarian system, where
the chamber of deputies would be ”power center”,(FAORO, 2001) and reflected the un-
derlying belief of the Moderate liberals in a constrained central government.(BASILE,
2010) But this was only the first of many changes advanced by the liberals in the early
thirties.
The two most important institutional changes put in place during the First Re-
gency were the 1832 reform of the code of Criminal Procedure and the 1834 Additional
Act. Even though both changes reflected the belief in provincial autonomy held by the
Moderate liberals, they were also affected by influence over public opinion exercised by
the Exalted. Basile (2010) and Sousa (2010) explain that many Moderates saw these pro-
autonomy changes as inevitable, and therefore tried to guide the process of policy-making
themselves as a way of emptying the Exalted discourse. This lack of complete belief in
these changes explains why many Moderates would take part in the Regress Movement
that reverts most of the institutional changes made during the Liberal period.
The 1832 Reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure diminished the power of
interference of the monarch over the Judiciary by diminishing the power of the magistrates
that were linked to the central government, and giving more power to the justice of the
peace (juiz de paz), that was an locally elected judicial member. The justice of the peace
had powers ranging from determining whom had access to the franchise to judging small
transgressions and making formal accusation in criminal process. Moreover, he was also
part of the newly established jury, that would judge crimes.(DOLHNIKOFF, 2005, p. 93)
The reasoning of giving such powers to a local judge was that this would enable the
law to be applied in places not reached by the central power, given the extension of the
territory and how badly integrated it was. But in reality, as the judge was elected locally
and had powers to influence the outcomes of legislative elections, it not only became a
position linked to the local elites but also in many opportunities the oligarchs themselves
exercised the function.(DOLHNIKOFF, 2005) Such shift of power to the local arena was
a considerable change to the framework built by the 1824 letter, and would be a source
of struggle between local groups and a focal point of dissension within the political elite.
Nevertheless,concomitant to the judicial reform, a more radical constitutional change was
also beginning in the chamber of deputies.
In 1832, the chamber of deputies dominated by the Moderate liberals and under
the influence of the Exalted approved a project of constitutional reform that was the
outcome of the assembly convoked by the temporary Regency in 1831 for drafting a new
body of law. This project would imply a significant change in the political organization
of the Empire: It declared Brazil to be a federal monarchy and changed the Regency
from trine to sole. It also abolished the Moderative Power, the Senate’s lifetime mandate,
and the Council of State; moreover, it completed the shift of power from the central
government to the provinces by creating the provincial assemblies and giving autonomy
to the municipalities. But the project had also to be approved by the Senate, that was
composed mainly by Caramurus, who were mainly against this decentralization effort and
vetoed the project.
The two main outcomes of this veto were the reaction by the minister of Justice
Feijo´. He planned a parliamentary coup, where the Chamber of deputies would become
a constitutional assembly and draft a new constitution with the changes vetoed by the
Senate written in it. But this coup did not move forward because it faced opposition even
from inside the Moderates.25 Given that the coup was not successful and the chamber
rejected the Senate’s vetoes, the project had to be discussed by the general assembly.
The final draft approved by the general assembly was a clear compromise between the
first draft and the Senate’s position. The lifelong tenure in the senate was kept as also
the Moderative power. On the other hand, it abolished the Council of State, changed
the Regency from trine to sole, and, more significantly, established that the provinces
had the right to create legislative assemblies with autonomy over decisions, inter alia,
about taxation26, public spending, public jobs at municipal and provincial level, police
forces.(BRASIL, 1834) of the nation, or as Skidmore (1999) states, the ”Regency’s exper-
iment with decentralization.” The final version of the text, written by the deputies Paulo
Arau´jo, Lima de Abreu, Bernardo de Vasconcelos, became known as the Additional Act
and was approved in 1834. This Act completed the liberal reforms advanced in the first
years of the Regency. It was not as radical as the first draft, but was one more step in the
direction of decentralization and provincial autonomy.
Even though the creation of the provincial assemblies transferred considerable
political power to the provinces, the Additional Act also strengthened the provincial pres-
ident and maintained his appointment as a duty of the central government. Schwarcz e
Starling (2018) see this as a self-contradiction and an example that the regents and the po-
litical elite were uncertain about the institutional landscape that they desired. Of course,
as any non-despotic political action, the Additional Act was fruit of compromises, but it
was not an example of self-contradiction. In reality, it represented the underlying belief
of the political elites in provincial autonomy as a mean to enhance the country’s unity.
Under this belief, the role of the president was to be the main representative of the central
government in the provinces, trying to give some homogeneity for provincial policies by ne-
gotiating with the local elites and trying to influence the local elections.(DOLHNIKOFF,
2005, pgs. 100-118)
The Additional Act is the last great institutional change guided by the moderate
25 The discourse made by Hono´rio Carneiro Lea˜o, a moderate liberal, is seen as key for the failure of
Feijo´’s coup. For a discussion about this, see Basile (2010, pages 78-79)
26 Excepting import-export taxation.
liberal, and the political struggles related to it can be seen as the main cause for the cre-
ation of the new political parties in Brazil, around 1837. Moreover, the drafting process
and the ultimate outcome from the general assembly is a clear example of the changing
times in the Brazilian political arena. The senators were capable of keeping their lifelong
tenure because the moderate liberals were not a cohesive group, and many voted in favor
of the first version not because of a strong belief in those reforms, but due to the cir-
cumstances. The approval of these decentralizing reforms would be both a defeat for the
”Caramurus” and would make the Exalted’s discourse empty.(BASILE, 2010) Moreover,
the approved version of the institutional reform reflected the world view of a man that is
a key figure throughout this period, deputy Bernardo Vasconcelos and his belief in ”fair
middle-ground” doctrine27, i.e., that it was necessary to give autonomy to the provinces,
but without endangering the public order and territorial integrity.(SOUSA, 2010)
Parallel to these changes and under the guidance of the minister of Justice and
future regent Diogo Feijo´, the permanent Regency created, still in 1831, the National
Guard. It was a national force, but organized by provinces. Every Brazilian man with ac-
cess to the franchise had to enlist. Even though the guard were organized by province and
its specific organization and field of action was determined by the provincial legislative
assembly, it was subordinated to the president, and therefore linked to the central Gov-
ernment.(DOLHNIKOFF, 2005) Not by accident, it main area of action would be in the
repression to the revolts and riots that emerged throughout the regencies28.(SCHWARCZ;
STARLING, 2018, p. 247)
In 1835, Diogo Feijo´, the former minister of Justice, was elected as the first sole
regent. This period in power would be marked by the eruption of the two major revolts
in the regential period, the Ragamuffin War (Guerra dos Farrapos) in the extreme south
of the country and the ”Cabanagem” in Para´,29 and the increase in the dissensions in the
congress given the disenchantment with the liberal period. The renunciation of Feijo´ in
September 19, 1837, marks the end of the liberal period in front of the Executive, and
the beginning of a movement that would become know as the Regress.
The moderate liberals used their majority in the chamber during the permanent
trine Regency to advance institutional reforms that reflected their belief in autonomy. This
belief is exemplified by the defense of the provincial autonomy made by Senator Cam-
pos Vergueiro in 1832: ”O u´nico meio de conservarmos unidas todas as nossas prov´ıncias
consiste em habilita´-las para poderem cuidar de suas necessidades e promover a sua pros-
27 Doutrina do justo meio.
28 The creation of the National force also had the effect of weakening the Army. This was not a side
effect, but a deliberate goal of the minister of justice and the liberals now in power. They saw the
army as a possible source of problems, given his actions in 1823 and 1831.[pages 347-348](FAORO,
2001)
29 We will discuss these two revolts below.
peridade por meio da influeˆncia dos seus pro´prios governos.”30 (DOLHNIKOFF, 2005,
p. 64)
The additional Act, the creation of the National Guard, and the code of criminal
procedure represents the institutionalization of the belief in autonomy and liberalism as
a mean to keep the unity. This is not a belief that emerged to deal with the contem-
porary revolts, but an old belief31 that only now could be translated in policies due to
the Emperor’s dominance over the country throughout the first reign. Therefore, it is not
without basis the notion defended by Calmon (1947) that the Independence begins de
facto in 1831, with the renunciation of Dom Pedro I.
Even though this was a period when many liberal beliefs could finally impact insti-
tutions, it was also a period of reorganization of Brazilian political forces. The moderate
liberals were the group with most members in the parliament and they were capable of
using this majority for advancing their desired reforms, but the struggles over the Ad-
ditional Act and the unsuccessful coup of 1832 made it clear that there were increasing
dissensions within the moderates. Moreover, the liberal reforms did not generate the ex-
pected outcomes. The judiciary decentralization did not take justice to places not reached
by the central government, instead it empowered the local elite and created local struggles
for these positions. The provincial autonomy associated with the creation of provincial
assemblies were incapable of inhibiting the emergence of new regional revolts. In the end,
Feijo’s Regency was an adequate epilogue for the liberal years. A period that began with
much promise and high expectations, but ended in frustration and disillusionment. The
frustration was such that it lead to the emergence of a new political movement that would
guide the process of reforms from then on.
This new movement was formed mainly by Caramurus, some Moderate dissidents,
and new political actors that were not in the chamber in the moment of the approval of
the Additional Act. Its declared goal was to create an institutional arrangement with more
power concentrated in the central government instead of the provinces, and had as one
of its main leader the ex-moderate Bernardo de Vasconcelos.(BASILE, 2010) It is from
this movement that would be created the Conservative party, in 1837, that would be one
of the two dominant political parties throughout the Second Reign, the other being the
Liberal party, mainly formed by former moderates that still defended the decentralizing
reforms.
30 ”The only way to keep all our provinces together is to enable them to take care of their needs and to
promote their prosperity through the influence of their own governments.”
31 For example, Ledo speaking from his hiding in 1822, defends that ”without a liberal Constitution that
invites their alliance” it’s possible that some provinces would continue separated from the Brazilian
Empire.(FAORO, 2001)
2.5.2 The Conservative Regress(1837 - 1842)
After Feijo´’s resignation in 1837, Arau´jo Lima assumed the role of sole regent, marking
the beginning of the Conservatives as the main political force in Brazil. Lima’s Regency
lasted from 1837 to 1840, when the regential period was put to an end by the ”coup”
orchestrated by the liberals declaring that Dom Pedro II was sufficiently mature to rule
with his 14 years of age.32 Even though he founded some institutions such as the Instituto
Histo´rico e Geogra´fico Brasileiro and the Cole´gio Dom Pedro II, his Regency is marked
by the beginning of the so-called Conservative Regress with the approval, in 1840, of a
law reinterpreting some aspects of the 1834 Additional Act.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING,
2018, p. 254)
The Conservative Party, formed in 1836, would stay in power, with a brief in-
terregnum in 1840, from 1837 to 1843. Throughout this period they put in place the
Conservative Regress, a series of constitutional amendments and institutional changes
reverting many of the decentralizing reforms put in place by the liberals in the early
1830s. These amendments are the Additional Act’s Interpretative Law, the reform of the
Criminal Procedure Law, and the recreation of the State Council.
On May 12, 1840, Arau´jo Lima sanctioned the Interpretative Act with eight ar-
ticles re-interpreting the 1834 Additional Act. The law transferred the control of the
Judicial police33 from the provincial assemblies to the central government; prohibited
the assemblies from creating or destructing general public jobs, i.e., jobs related to the
central government apparatus; regulated when the assemblies could fire magistrates; and
established that laws enacted by the provincial assemblies, but that the province pres-
ident considered unconstitutional would be analyzed by the national congress.(??) In
sum, this Reinterpretation established clear boundaries between the competencies of the
central government and the provinces.(DOLHNIKOFF, 2005) And by establishing these
boundaries, it reinforced the position of the central government relative to the provinces.
In December 1841, already after the ”adulthood coup”, it is sanctioned the imperial
law no 261 that reformed the 1832 code of criminal procedure. It created the role of
delegate, that would be responsible for the criminal inquiry. The delegate would be chosen
by the Police Chief, who was nominated by the province president or the ministry of
justice. Moreover, the role of defining those apt to participate in the jury was transferred
from the justice of the peace to the police delegates.(BRASIL, 1841) The real effect of
this revision was to weaken the role of the justice of the peace, by transferring all criminal
competency from them to agents linked to the central government.(FAORO, 2001) It is
important to note the relevance of this reform. As previously noted, the justice of the
32 In practice, in the initial years of Dom Pedro II’s reign the Executive rule would be exercised by the
adulthood Ministry.
33 The judicial police was responsible to investigate crimes. Close to the current Brazilian civil police.
peace was a locally elective member of the judiciary, and the power given to him by the
1832 code was a clear transfer of power from the central government to the provinces,
and this reform completely reverted this, not only it emptied the role of justice of the
peace, but also transferred his most important duties to positions linked to the central
government.
The reforms put in place by the Conservatives suffered a harsh opposition from
the liberals, even resulting in the 1842 revolt captained by the former regent Diogo Feijo´.
But, it is interesting to note that some of these reforms dealt with situations that the lib-
erals themselves had perceived as undesirable. For example, the same Feijo´, while regent,
complained about the decentralization of the judiciary created by the Additional Act:
Bem que as assemble´ias provinciais possam sem du´vida alguma criar e
suprimir os empregos administrativos provinciais e dar a cada um deles as
atribuic¸o˜es que lhes parecem convenientes, releva observar quanto sera´ nocivo
a regular administrac¸a˜o da justic¸a, e mesmo ao direito das partes, que elas
alterem por qualquer maneira as atribuic¸o˜es que competem a´s autoridades ju-
dicia´rias, pelo transtorno e confusa˜o que semelhante medida imprimiria no sis-
tema juidicia´rio, que deve ser uniforme em todo o Impe´rio.34 (DOLHNIKOFF,
2005, p. 131)
The conservative regress is completed with the re-creation of the State Council in
1841, a considerable departure from the 1834 Additional Act that expressively dissolved
the former Council.(BRASIL, 1834, article 32)
The reforms advanced by the Conservatives from 1837 to 1842 entered in the
Brazilian historiography as the ”Regress”; these reforms sought to revert many of the
decentralizing policies enacted by the liberals, therefore in some way it was a regress to
the institutional setting in place before the liberal period. The impact of these reforms
was such that Faoro (2001) states that the Reinterpretation Act reduced ”to dust the
conquests from April 7.”
One interesting fact is that even though these changes were substantial, many of
them had been defended before even by a liberal such as Feijo´. Moreover, as Calmon
(1947)35 notes, the liberals considered these changes useful enough to not try to change
them when in power from 1844 to 1848. From this perspective, Dolhnikoff (2005) tries
34 ”Although provincial assemblies can undoubtedly create and suppress provincial administrative jobs
and give each of them the assignments they deem appropriate, it is important to observe how harmful
it will be to regulate the administration of justice, and even to the right of the parties that they
alter in any way the attributions that are incumbent on the judicial authorities. For the disorder and
confusion that such a measure would impose on the judicial system, which must be uniform throughout
the Empire.”
35 p. 337
to argue that the Regress reforms were only peripheral, and the overall decentralization
desired by the liberals survived. Even though the point is well made, it is hard to accept
that the liberals would even raise arms and try a coup, as they did in 1842, as an answer to
minor changes.36 Moreover, at least fiscally, the centralization was undeniable. By 1856,
83% of the State revenue was concentrated in the federal government and just 14% in
the provincial level.(CARVALHO, 1982, pg. 267) And from all the public employees, 69%
where federal, while 24% were provincial.
2.5.3 The regential revolts and the ”adulthood coup”
[...] o governo das regeˆncias apenas tem [dado] a` nac¸a˜o um u´nico benef´ıcio,
todavia o mais relevante; que e´ o de firmar nos corac¸o˜es brasileiros o amor da
monarquia. Marqueˆs de Paranagua´ (BASILE, 2010)
The regential period was plagued with regional revolts what reflected the lack of
dominance of the central government over all the Empire, and the lack of ability of the
regents and the members of government to deal with the provincial interests. Carvalho
(1982) divides these revolts into two time periods. The first group encompasses the revolts
that emerged from the abdication from 1831 to 1835, one year after the death of Dom
Pedro. The second group encompasses a series of revolts that began in 1835 with some
finishing only after years inside the Second Reign.37
Table 1 – Main Regential Revolts
1831 - 1835 Period Location Main Actors
Six rebellions 1831-32 Court Army and urban pop.
Setembrada 1831 Recife Army
Novembrada 1831 Recife Army
Abrilada 1832 Pernambuco Army
Cabanos 1832-35 Pernambuco\Alagoas Small farmers, slaves, and natives
Carneirada 1834-35 Recife Army
Maleˆs’ Revolt 1835 Salvador Slaves
1835 - 1842 Period Location Main Actors
Cabanagem 1835-1840 Para´ elites; natives, slaves, and peasants
Farroupilha 1835 Rio Grand do Sul landowners
Sabinada 1837-38 Salvador Army and urban pop.
Balaiada 1838-41 Maranha˜o landowners, peasants, and slaves
Liberal revolts 1842 Rio, Sa˜o Paulo, MG political elite
Adapted from Carvalho (1982)
36 For a critical analysis of Dohlnikoff’s position see the note 92 in Basile (2010).
37 In 1, it is shown the main revolts of both periods. We are going to discuss just some of them.
For Carvalho, the revolts that emerged before the Additional Act erupted in the
main province capitals and were mostly composed of low-ranked members of the Army
and the urban population, and reflected a mix of urban anxieties. Salvador, Recife, and
the Court were the main focus of revolts. We are not going to spend much time on these
revolts, but at least two of them are worth further discussion: The Cabanada and the
Revolt of Maleˆs.
Following the abdication of Dom Pedro I erupted at Pernambuco the ”Cabanada”
or War of the Cabanos(1832 - 1835). The insurgency was formed by a heterogeneous group:
small landowners, peasants, natives, slaves, and had the support of some restaurateurs
politicians and claimed for the return of Dom Pedro I. The revolt survived for three years
but with the death of Dom Pedro I in 1834, the movement lost power and in 1835 it
was definitely defeated.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018) In 1835 erupted in Salvador
the Revolt of the Maleˆs. It was a slave revolt that was quickly controlled but evidenced a
capability of mobilization between the slaves and freed people. This was seen as a prelude
to a rebellion in the form of the Haitian revolution and lead to the approval of a strict law
against slave revolts, but in some way, these fears were without basis and this was the only
great slave revolt during the Imperial period.(CARVALHO, 1982, p. 251) The presence of
the Army in different revolts explain why the National Guard, that was initially designed
as a militia beyond the power of the monarch, became the main military tool for keeping
the order.
Following the decentralizing reforms of the Additional Act, the revolts also became
more decentralized, less urban, and with a higher death toll.38 Some good examples of
the change in nature is the Cabanagem that began as a struggle between the local elites
in Para´, and ended by incorporating all the strata of society. And also the revolt of the
ragamuffins, whose main members were landowners seeking economic favors. Some of these
revolts would be controlled just in the 1940s, and one of the key elements that diminished
the confidence in the regencies.
One example of the anti-regential sentiment existent in this period is the Sabi-
nada, that erupted in Bahia(1837 - 1838). This movement supported the installation of
an independent republic in Bahia, but the independence would subsist only during the
Regency. The official estimative is that 1258 rebels and 594 official soldiers died in this
conflict.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018, pgs. 258-259) The year of 1835 saw the erup-
tion of two major revolts, the ”War of Cabanagem”(1835 - 1840) and the Ragamuffin
War or Guerra dos Farrapos(1835 - 1845). The Cabanagem began as a struggle between
monarchists and regionalists, but it became a social struggle between the elite at large,
and the cabanos: native, blacks, and mestizos that lived at the cabanas39. The striking fact
38 Carvalho1982
39 huts
about this revolt is the death toll associated with it. It is estimated that around 40% of
province’s population died in this conflict, approximately 35.000 people. (SCHWARCZ;
STARLING, 2018, p. 252) (SKIDMORE, 1999, p. 45)
The Ragamuffin War(1835 - 1845) is the longest internal conflict in Brazilian his-
tory. It began in the Rio Grande do Sul and spread to Santa Catarina. Although it
acquired a separatist tone with time, culminating in the declaration of the Piratini Re-
public in September 1836; at least some of the revolt’s leaders initially were loyal to the
future monarch.(SCHWARCZ; STARLING, 2018, 262) The initial motivation of the re-
volt was the amount of taxes that the farmers had to pay and the centralization imposed
by 1824 charter. With Uruguayans’ support, the insurgents could keep the fight for more
time than usual. The conflict would finish only in 1845, five years into the Second Reign.
Even though they lost military, politically the insurgents acquired many concessions from
the central government, such as the general amnesty.40.(CALMON, 1947, p. 350)
All the revolts of the period ”disillusioned the exalted41 ” and reinforced the belief
that monarchy had a key role in keeping the peace and unity of the territory.(CALMON,
1947, p. 327) This belief was also reinforced by the fact that some of the revolts had
as a goal to keep autonomy, but just until the coronation of Dom Pedro II. Take as an
example of this feeling, the words said by the senator Jose´ Bento on May 25, 1840: ”Sr.
Presidente, na e´poca presente, a` vista das cr´ıticas circunstanciais em que esta´ o pa´ıs, todos
olham para o monarca.42”(CALMON, 1947, p. 327) It’s under this mood and resenting
the loss of power in 1837 that the liberals advance the idea of anticipating the coronation
of Dom Pedro II. And given that the conservatives were also unable to put an end to the
major revolts, they did not have many arguments against this idea. Therefore on July 23,
1840, three years before reaching 18 years old D. Pedro II was declared a legal adult and
therefore able to rule.
As well noted in the Marquis of Paranagua´’s discourse, the turmoils of the re-
gential period were such that it reinforced the belief that the monarchy and a monarch
were necessary for keeping Brazilian internal order and territorial integrity, and all this
culminated in the coup that lead Dom Pedro II to the throne. The end of the Ragamuffin
War in 1845 and the control of the liberal revolts of 1842 and 184543, consolidated the
monarchic institution. For the next decades, Brazil would live without major internal re-
volts, and the monarchy would be seen as the core source of this situation. Such a view
is well summarized by Antoˆnio Raiol:
40 For a in depth discussion on this war, see Pesavento (1985).
41 Exalted were radical liberals with some desire for a republican government.
42 Mr. President, at the present time, in view of the critical situations in which the country is, everyone
looks at the monarch.
43 The Revoluc¸a˜o Praieira (1848- 1850) was a separatist and federalism revolt that erupted at Pernam-
buco in 1848.
How different [we Brazilians are] from other people who inhabit the same
South American continent. When we rest, they fight. When we fraternize, they
quarrel. A government monarchic, hereditary, is without doubt a true choice,
which tames ambitions and because of stability forms a powerful element of
order and prosperity.”(MAXWELL, 2003, p. 167)
The combination of the liberals institutional changes from early 1930s and the
reforms from the conservative regress created the institutional organization of the second
reign. The last act that completed the second Reign institutional landscape is the creation
by Dom Pedro II, in 1847, of the Council of ministries and the role of president of the
council. This council would be responsible for the Executive power, and the emperor
would keep the Moderate Power. Because the president was appointed by the emperor
and not by the legislative, this became known as parlamentarismo a`s avessas (Backward
Parliarmentarism).
2.6 Through the lens of the main framework
The role of core beliefs is to clarify the relationship between institutions and socioeconomic
outcomes.44 In particular, we are focusing on the core beliefs held by those capable of
affecting institutions, the individuals and organizations members of the dominant network.
From the early 1820s to the 1840s, the real question facing the dominant network was
how to keep the integrity of Brazilian territory. The answer given by the political elite
was that a constitutional monarchy was necessary to avoid balkanization and revolution.
The years analyzed in this chapter(1808 - 1847) represents a complete cycle of the
framework. Initially, Brazil was in the ”colonial autopilot”; even though Colonial Brazil
was the main economic part of the Portuguese Empire at the beginning of the 19th century,
its colonial status was not a problem for the Brazilian elite because Portugal sought to
accommodate them inside the state organization. The arrival of the Crown in 1808 and the
subsequent institutional reforms put in place by Dom Joa˜o VI dismantled the old colonial
system, creating an autonomous Brazil. Following this, in the place of the acceptance of
the colonial status emerged a belief in an autonomous Brazil, but with links to Portugal.
This notion institutionalized by the rise in status of Brazil to a kingdom and the creation
of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarves, in 1815.
But the eruption of the Porto Liberal Revolution in 1820 would be a shock to
this new equilibrium. The anti-Brazilian stance adopted by the Portuguese Cortes and
its attempt to revert Brazil to a colonial status made it impossible to maintain the belief
in an autonomous Brazil but with links to Portugal. This created a narrow window of
44 Given the ever-present uncertainty in the world and the lack of perfect feedback, there is nothing that
implies that these beliefs must be correct most of the time.
opportunity. It was narrow because after all the institutional reforms put in place by Dom
Joa˜o VI Brazil was de facto autonomous. And, as Brazilians did not desire a return to
the old colonial status and Portugal had no way to impose its domination upon Brazil,
Brazilian independence was a given. Therefore, the real question for the Brazilian political
elite in the early 1820s was how to keep the vast and poorly integrated territory united.
At this moment, the mandarins45 of the Empire exercised the key leadership role in
the institutional making of the new country. Their core belief was that just a constitutional
monarchy with autonomy to the provinces could keep the integrity of the territory. Given
that a monarchy presupposes a king, they built the independence process around the
image of the prince regent. Even though the choice for the monarchy was unanimous, how
liberal46 the monarchy should be was a point in dispute. The Constitutional Assembly of
1823 could be a constitutional moment that would institutionalize the dominant network’s
liberal beliefs. But the demise of the constitutional assembly by Dom Pedro and the
imposition of a Constitution meant the interruption of the constitutional moment, and
Pedro I’s repeated anti-liberal actions were a stress test for the belief in a constitutional
and liberal monarchy. But the dynamic that led to his resignation in 1831 is an example
of how deep ran the belief in a liberal political order. Pedro’s resignation could be seen
as a window of opportunity for a move towards republicanism, but given the lack of any
organized republican movement in Brazil and the dominant network’s belief, this was
instead the beginning of a period of institutional and belief deepening around the idea of
a united Brazil with a liberal constitutional monarchy.
The regential period is usually divided into two periods, the liberal years (1831
- 1837) and the conservative regress(1837 - 184247). The liberal period was a period of
decentralizing reforms when the liberal part of the dominant network had the opportunity
to institutionalize much of their belief, culminating with the 1834 Additional Act. But,
one of the key insights of our guiding framework is that any institutional reform must
generate the expected outcomes for going through a ”deepening process” when these
new rules really take roots in the society. But the liberal reforms did not bring forth
the expected outcomes. Instead of order and justice, the decentralization created local
struggles and regional revolts.
The outcomes were so distant from the expected that the Moderate liberals that
guided the reform process could not keep themselves as a coherent group anymore, and
subdivided into Liberals and Conservatives, the latter also composed by the Caramurus.
45 Here we are following Pang e Seckinger (1972) that use this term to refer to Brazilian magistrate. This
is the political elite studied by (CARVALHO, 1982).
46 It is important to have clear what is this liberalism. This is not the classical liberalism of individual
liberties. Its main political flag is provincial autonomy, without mention to social questions.
47 The Regency ends in 1840 with the declaration of the adulthood. But in the first years, the central
government is directed by the comiteˆ da maioridade, that after some months in liberal hands goes to
the conservatives.
As an answer to these failures emerged the conservative Regress. They sought to reinforce
the power of the central government and the role of the monarch. Even though they were
not capable of putting an end to the ongoing Ragamuffin War, their reforms created the
basis of the Empire and went through a deepening process. The creation of the role of
president of the ministry in 1847 and the centralization of the National Guard in 1850
are examples of institutional deepening process because they reinforced the initial reforms
advanced during the Conservative Regress.
The revolts from the regential period and the incapability of liberals and conser-
vatives of controlling them reinforced the belief that a monarch was necessary for keeping
the order and internal cohesion and culminated in the declaration of Dom Pedro II adult-
hood in 1840.48 Therefore, the Regress and the 1840 coup created the institutional basis of
the Brazilian Empire. The end of the Ragamuffin War (Guerra dos Farrapos) in 1845 and
the control of the liberal revolts of 1842 and 1848 were more steps towards the acceptance
of the order created in the last decade, i.e., moments of belief deepening. The Empire of
Brazil would be a constitutional monarchy, with autonomy to the provinces but a strong
central power. In this new autopilot, Brazilian political system would be ”Backward Par-
liamentarism”, Brazil would be a constitutional monarchy, but with a king that not only
reigns but also governs.
As Alston (2017) notes, beliefs are multidimensional, having a political, economic,
and social facet. In our analysis, we focused on the change in political beliefs and its
institutional implications because there was little change in the other facets. Brazilian
independence and the posterior process of institutional making and reform did not affect
the socioeconomic status quo. Brazil continued to be an exporter of raw goods, the main
source of labor power were the slaves, access to education was restricted to the elite, and
big landowners had considerable local power with the majority of the population excluded
from any real political exercise. The changes that happened in this period were restricted
to the overall political organization of the nation, not in access to political power itself.
48 We do not ignore that this was a movement mainly orchestrated by the liberals, resenting the loss
of power. But it is accepted in the historiography that the regential revolts reinforced the perception
that the monarch’s presence was necessary for stabilization
Conclusion
From 1808 to 1848, Brazil went from being a colony to being an independent and stable
monarchy. When you consider the balkanization that Spanish America went through
and the fact that the new Latin American countries that were created always chose a
republican government, the Brazilian path was really unusual.49 Using the framework
developed by Alston et al. (2016) we analyzed this period trying to understand how
Portuguese America was capable of going through independence keeping the integrity of
territory and why Brazil became a monarchy and not a republic as the other American
countries.
Following the framework, we emphasized the co-evolution between institutions
and beliefs and the role of leadership in directing the institutional choice in a moment
of transition from being a colonial territory to an independent country. But, we also
had to go beyond the framework by inserting the role of external relations for a better
understanding of the period.
The role of leading Brazil through the independence process was exercised by the
magistrates, whom we called the mandarins of the empire. They shared the goal of keeping
Brazil’s integrity and the common belief that only a monarchic regime would be capable
of achieving this. Even though the first reign did not generate the expected political
outcomes, the quasi-republican experiment of the Regential period was so frustrating
that it reinforced the belief in the need of a monarch for stabilizing the new country and
keeping its unity.
Even though the mandarins had a role of leadership, they could not govern alone
because the big landowners and slaveholders were the economic basis of the new country
and had much power at the provincial level. This explains some of the choices made by
mandarins, such as the resistance against British pressure for ending the Atlantic slave
trade and the posterior long life of slavery in Brazil. The reading was that any movement
in this direction could weaken the support of the big farmers to the monarchy and this
would mean not the end of the monarchy but also the end of the territorial integrity.
One point where we had to go beyond the original framework was the introduction
of the external relation, because to consider the role of ascendancy that Great Britain had
over Portugal and Brazil is key for understanding many of the key events of the period.
Without British pressure it is far from certain that the Portuguese Royal family would
have made the transatlantic migration and put in motion a chain of events that led to
49 There were two experiments with a monarchic government in Mexico. One between 1821-1823 and
other between 1863-1867. Neither became a stable government.
the end of Brazilian colonial status, its elevation to Kingdom, and a consequent change
in the elites’ beliefs that paved the path to Independence.
Alston et al. (2018) urges the application of the framework in different case studies
for creating a better understanding of institutional evolution and refining the framework.
We tried to answer this calling by applying the framework to Brazilian history. Even
though it was a good guide, it was necessary to augment it with the role played by the
international great power of the period. As Tamayo (2014) had to make the same augmen-
tation, it seems to be a signal that it is not possible to analyze the institutional evolution
of developing countries without considering the role played by the big international forces
of the moment.
As seen in the literature review, our main framework considers three institutional
axes, political, social, and economic. We focused on the political axis because the other
went through minor changes throughout this period. The elite’s focus was in stabilizing
the new nation and creating a governmental structure capable of keeping united the huge
territory. But there were no efforts or desire in making a fairer society. In reality, much
of the efforts concerning the stabilization of new country were related in keeping in place
the status quo present before the Independence. Nothing exemplified this better than
the resistance to the British pressure for putting an end to the Slave Trade. In economic
terms, there were no major changes either. Given the treaties signed with Great Britain
and the social structure of the society, the Brazilian economy continued to be export-led
and based on slavery.
Even though there was the presence of recurrent elections, they were mostly dic-
tated by the local landlords with the major part of population being just spectators and
a manipulated mass, or nor participating at all given the slavery condition. In sum, even
though Brazil became independent most of its population still were captives. Captives
due to slavery or captives due to dependence on the landlords, but captives anyway. The
political regime changed, but the economic and social aspects of the society went through
this period of institutional making and innovation without suffering any major changes
at all.
The last paragraph gives rise to the following question:Did Brazil really go through
a critical transition in the moment of independence? The answer is ambiguous. For the
members of the dominant network, it was indeed the consolidation of a critical transition
that began in 1808. The economic elite, landowners and slaveholders, were for exporting
to foreign countries and could import from countries different from Portugal. The political
elite could now guide, or at least influence considerably Brazil’s institutional path. But,
for the majority of the population, it is hard to believe that they experimented any
considerable change. In some way, the policies that enabled the mandarins of the empire
to achieve their objective of keeping the country united, were also responsible for keeping
the population from benefiting from the new political order.
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